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"POST-MODERN" SOVEREIGN DEBT CRISIS:
DID MEXICO NEED AN INTERNATIONAL
BANKRUPTCY FORUM?
John H. Chun
INTRODUCTION
On the evening of January 30, 1995, Leon Panetta, the White House
Chief of Staff, received two distressing phone calls within the space of
a few minutes.' One caller was Guillermo Ortiz, the Mexican Finance
Minister. Mr. Ortiz anxiously reported that Mexico was beset by a
capital flight-foreign bondholders were dumping their tesobonos3
holdings and fleeing Mexico in a speculative panic.4 These investors,
not willing to roll over5 the maturity of their tesobonos, were now
redeeming them at a frenzied rate.6 Mexico, trying to honor its obli-
gations by faithfully exchanging the bonds for hard currency, was dan-
gerously depleting its exchange reserves.7 Without an immediate
infusion of foreign aid, Mexico would have to impose exchange con-
1. George Graham et aL, Bitter Legacy of Battle to Ball Out Mexico, Fin. Tmes,
Feb. 16, 1995, at 4.
2. idt Capital flight occurs when a country, like Mexico, needs fresh loans in
order to finance an investment project to repay old loans. Jeffrey Sachs, Do We Need
an International Lender of Last Resort 6-7 (Apr. 1995) (unpublished manuscript, on
file with the Fordham Law Review). If fresh loans are granted and the investment
project is completed, the country can repay the preexisting debt. Id. If no new loans
are made, however, the preexisting debt will be defaulted. Id. at 7. Each investor
fears that every other investor will not subscribe to the new loan. Id. Thus, every
individual creditor, expecting the country to default, will refuse to extend new loans
because the creditor does not want to incur additional losses. See id. Instead, each
individual creditor will rush to unload his investments from that country. See id.
3. Tesobonos are short-term bonds indexed to the U.S. dollar but repayable in
pesos. See Daniel Dombey, Tesobonos May be Good Devaluation Hedge, LDC Debt
Rep., Aug. 29,1994, at 1-2. Thus, investors, fearful of a possible Mexican peso devalu-
ation, bought tesobonos to hedge against this risk. Id.
4. See Graham et al, supra note 1, at 4.
5. Roll over is the "[blanking term for extension or renewal of short term loan
from one loan period... to another." Black's Law Dictionary 1330 (6th ed. 1990).
6. See Robert McGough & Sara Calian, Adios, Amigos: Mutual Funds Flee
Emerging Markets-Led By the Managers, Wall St. J., Jan. 13, 1995, at Al. Later
studies by the International Monetary Fund revealed that Mexican investors had pre-
cipitated the capital ffight by staging a run on their own currency. See Clay Chandler,
IMF Ties Peso Crisis to Mexican Investors, Wash. Post, Aug. 21, 1995, at Al.
7. See Graham et al., supra note 1, at 4. Exchange reserves are a nation's ac-
cumulation of foreign currencies. See John C. Pool & Steve Stamos, The ABCs of
International Finance: Understanding the Trade and Debt Crisis 27 (1987). Mexican
exchange reserves had fallen to about $3.5 billion by January 27. 1995. Graham et al,
supra note 1, at 4.
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trols,8 abandon the convertibility9 of the peso and essentially default
on the remainder of its debt obligations.
The other caller, Speaker of the House Newt Gingrich, added to the
troubling reports from Mexico.' According to the Speaker, Congress
would not approve President Clinton's requested $40 billion aid pack-
age for Mexico for at least another two weeks. 2 Despite the initial
bipartisan support for the aid,' 3 dissent in Congress had caused the
package to stall. 14 Some members of Congress expressed skepticism
to the notion that the Mexican crisis posed a serious threat to interna-
tional financial stability, arguing instead that the aid package was pri-
marily intended to bail out' 5 Wall Street investors who had speculated
in Mexican debt instruments.' 6
This development greatly troubled the Chief of Staff. Time was of
the essence-the Clinton Administration could not wait for the Con-
8. A country's imposition of exchange controls usually includes the following re-
strictions: (1) prohibiting residents from transferring the country's currency to non-
residents without the government's authorization, while requiring non-residents to
obtain permission to transfer the state's currency to another non-resident; (2) requir-
ing non-resident holders of the state's currency to obtain state approval prior to trans-
ferring the currency to the state's residents; (3) prohibiting its residents from holding
foreign currency without the state's permission. Richard W. Edwards, Jr., Interna-
tional Monetary Collaboration 382 (1985). Because the holder of a state's currency
has a claim on its economy, a state imposes exchange controls to regulate the magni-
tude and nationality of those claims. Id. at 381.
9. A currency is freely convertible when the state issuing the currency in no way
restricts the right of residents or non-residents to hold the currency, the manner in
which its currency may be exchanged for foreign currency, the currencies for which its
own currency may be exchanged, and a non-resident holder's use of its currency. Id.
10. See Graham et al., supra note 1, at 4. The peso, valued at an anemic 6.35
against the dollar, was at a historic low, merely half its value from a month earlier. Id.
"If Mexico had resorted to foreign exchange controls, it 'would have been a true
world catastrophe as the pressure on other [states] to follow would have been tremen-
dous .... ' " Id. (quoting Michel Camdessus, Managing Director of the International
Monetary Fund).
According to one commentator, however, Mexico would not have dared to institute
exchange controls. See Cynthia C. Lichtenstein, The Mexican Crisis: Who Should Be
a Country's Lender of Last Resort?, 18 Fordham Int'l L.J. 1769, 1775 (1995) [hereinaf-
ter Lender of Last Resort]. The "new rules" of the international capital markets
would not have tolerated this act of default and international investors would have
shunned Mexico in the future. See id.
11. Graham et al., supra note 1, at 4.
12. Id.
13. George Graham, Apathy and Presidential Weakness Scupper Debt Plan, Fin.
Times, Feb. 1, 1995, at 6.
14. See Tim Carrington & Paul B. Carroll, U.S. Lawmakers Remain Unconvinced
of Need to Back Rescue Plan for Mexico, Wall. St. J., Jan. 30, 1995, at A2; see infra
notes 129-34 and accompanying text.
15. A bailout is a form of government subsidy designed to prevent an enterprise
from collapsing. Cheryl D. Block, Overt and Covert Bailouts: Developing A Public
Bailout Policy, 67 Ind. L. 951, 956 (1992).
16. See infra note 132 and accompanying text.
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gressional aid to materialize.' 7 To calm investors, restore their confi-
dence in the long-term solvency of the Mexican economy, and plug
the hemorrhage of investment from Mexico, quick approval of an aid
package was vital.'8 Mexico was Washington's "star pupil" in market-
based reforms and its failure could cause politicians in other develop-
ing countries to reconsider the wisdom of their own market-based re-
forms.19 Worse, a Mexican debacle could cause investors in other
developing economies to reappraise the risk of their investments there
and trigger a contagious effect on neighboring countries."0 A delay
could precipitate a repeat of the 1982 debt crisis when multiple Latin
American countries were simultaneously unable to repay their debt.2 '
President Clinton himself also expressed disappointment in the de-
lay in Congress.' Although the possibility remained that Congress
might eventually pass the originally requested $40 billion aid package,
President Clinton stated that "it [would] not do so immediately [and]
17. Douglas Jehl, Slow-Building Despair Led to Decision on Aid, N.Y. Times, Feb.
1, 1995, at A16. According to Treasury Secretary Robert Rubin. -there was only a
very short time in all likelihood to act in which to avert crisis, financial distress and
probably default in Mexico." Graham et al., supra note 1. at 4.
18. See David E. Sanger, Peso Rescue Sets New Limits on Mexico. N.Y. Times,
Feb. 22, 1995, ai Al, D6 [hereinafter Peso Rescue].
19. Graham et al., supra note 1, at 4; see infra note 108 and accompanying text.
20. Graham et al., supra note 1, at 4; see infra notes 155-58 and accompanying
text.
21. The causes of the 1982 Mexican collapse were sown when Latin American
countries, during the 1970s, borrowed heavily from United States banks to finance
balance of payments deficits caused by large increases in oil prices and to invest in
infrastructure projects. See Patricia A. Wertman, Mexico Financial Crisis, 1982- and
1995: Similarities and Differences, Congressional Research Service Report for Con-
gress, Feb. 3, 1995, at CRS-1, CRS-4 [hereinafter Mexico Financial Crisis]. Despite
the size of the loans, the Latin American countries gambled that the high inflation
during the 1970s would continue and thus translate into loan repayment with depreci-
ated dollars in the future. IL
The banks were eager to lend in order to generate interest on the large capital
deposits from wealthy Arab countries, who were generating huge profits from the
increase in oil sales. Id. The banks, in their eagerness to lend, did not scrutinize the
economies of the borrowing countries or the uses to which the borrowers were putting
the money. Alberto Gonzalo Santos, Note, Beyond Baker and Brady: Deeper Debt
Reduction for Latin American Sovereign Debtors, 66 N.Y.U. L Rev. 66, 72 (1991).
Had they chosen to look, the banks would have noticed that the borrowers were in-
vesting in inefficient public projects that would not generate enough income to repay
the loans. Ld. at 74.
In 1979, when the U.S. Federal Reserve increased United States interest rates to
combat inflation, the Latin American gamble was lost and the debtor nations soon
found themselves unable to pay their debts. IaL at 75. For a more detailed discussion
of the 1982 crisis, see John H. Makin, The Global Debt Crisis (1984).
By most accounts, the debt crisis lasted until the implementation of the Brady Plan
in 1989. See infra note 108 and accompanying text. For purposes of this Note, the
years between 1982, the year in which Mexico defaulted on its external debt, and the
introduction of the Brady Plan in 1989 will be referred to collectively as the "1982
debt crisis."
22. Jehl, supra note 17, at A16.
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therefore, it [would] not do so in time. '23 No international channels
existed to which the Clinton Administration could turn for effective
management of a crisis with the magnitude of Mexico's.4 The crisis
was unique due to the speed with which it developed, the possible
disastrousness of its consequences, and the amount of money required
to remedy it.' Despite the urgent need for an effective solution, how-
ever, no institution assumed responsibility for managing the crisis.2 6
This vacuum in international financial management forced the Clinton
Administration to choose between two evils: (1) bypassing traditional
consultation and approval procedures at the International Monetary
Fund ("IMF") 27 and the Bank for International Settlements ("BIS")2 8
in order to secure a hasty $50 billion bailout drawn primarily from
United States and IMF resources which would outrage and embitter
international and Congressional leaders,29 or (2) risk the possibly far-
reaching and devastating economic effects of a Mexican economic col-
lapse.3" The Clinton Administration chose the former option.3
Commentators have termed the 1995 Mexican crisis the first "post-
modern" crisis32 or the first crisis of the twenty-first century.33 The
crisis in Mexico was the product of a changing international financial
23. Graham et al., supra note 1, at 4.
24. See Michel Camdessus, Address at the Council of the Americas Conference
(May 22, 1995), in State Dep't Briefing, May 22, 1995, at 5 (on file with the Fordham
Law Review) [hereinafter Camdessus Address]; see also U.S. and International Re-
sponse to the Mexican Financial Crisis: Hearings before the House Comm. on Banking
and Financial Services, 104th Cong., 1st. Sess. 5, 6 (1995) (statement of Alan Green-
span, Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board) [hereinafter Greenspan Testimony];
Moises Naim, Mexico's Larger Story, 99 Foreign Pol'y 112, 112 (1995); Patricia A.
Wertman, The Halifax "Emergency Financing Mechanism": Expanding the General
Arrangements to Borrow (GAB), Congressional Research Service Report for Con-
gress, June 30, 1995, at CRS-1 to -2 [hereinafter Halifax] (observing that the principal
question raised by the Mexican crisis was the ability of international monetary institu-
tions to deal with short-term capital or the "hot money").
25. Naim, supra note 24, at 122; see infra part I.C.
26. The Bank for International Settlements, on January 3, 1995, had pledged to
lend $5 billion to Mexico. See Graham et al., supra note 1, at 4. The International
Monetary Fund, on January 26, 1995, had also pledged to loan Mexico $7.8 billion, its
largest loan ever. Id. The news of the loans, however, failed to calm the markets. See
id.
27. For a background of the IMF, see infra part IV.B.
28. The Bank for International Settlements is generally regarded as the bank for
central banks. See Edwards, supra note 8, at 56. It was established in 1930 in Basle,
Switzerland to enhance cooperation between central banks. Id. at 52. The BIS per-
forms a wide variety of banking transactions for its shareholder banks, including mak-
ing advances to them, holding current and time deposits, and buying and selling gold
and foreign exchange. Id. at 56.
29. See infra notes 119-34 and accompanying text.
30. Kenneth N. Gilpin, Far-Reaching Effects Seen If Mexico Rescue is Halted, N.Y.
Times, Jan. 23, 1995, at D1.
31. See infra part I.B.
32. Thomas L. Friedman, New Mexico, N.Y. Times, Mar. 15, 1995, at A25.
33. See Camdessus Address, supra note 24, at 1; James D. Humphrey II, Note,
Foreign Affairs Powers and "The First Crisis of the 21st Century:" Congressional v.
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system within which technological innovations, the use of risky finan-
cial instruments, and the recent growth of and dependence on short-
term capital have forged deeper financial integration but have also
subjected many developing nations' to the risks of an irrational capi-
tal flight similar to that which occurred in Mexico.35 Simultaneously,
the globalization of the securities markets has dramatically expanded
the global reach of financial turbulence caused by investors who, en
masse, move their money around the world.' In sum, although eco-
nomic indicators in Mexico in the aftermath of the bailout were gener-
ally positive,37 the Mexican crisis was not an economic aberration.
Rather, the Mexican crisis revealed deep fault lines underlying the in-
ternational financial system which are capable of creating upheaval at
any time.
38
World leaders have recognized the urgent need to fashion an inter-
national mechanism that can respond to a post-modern crisis. 39 At
the Group of Seven ("G-7")1 summit in Halifax, Nova Scotia on June
Executive Authority and the Stabilization Plan for Mexico, 17 Mich. J. Int'l L 181. 182
(1995).
34. In this Note, the term "developing country" or "developing nation" applies to
the same countries that were formerly labelled as -less developed countries" in the
1970s and as "emerging markets" in the 1990's. Mexico Financial Crisis, supra note 21.
at CRS-5 n.21. The group of developing countries includes: Egypt, Pakistan, Argen-
tina, Brazil, Mexico, and India. See 1994 International Monetary Fund, Annual Re-
port at vi (1994). Notably, the coining of the term "emerging market" corresponded
to the same time these countries began floating large amounts of bonds in the capital
markets; perhaps issuers coined it in an effort to reduce risk perception in the minds
of investors. Mexico Financial Crisis, supra note 21, at CRS-5 n.21.
35. See Naim, supra note 24, at 125.
36. See infra notes 150-58 and accompanying text.
37. See, e.g., Carole Gould, After a Dismal '95, Small Markets Surge, N.Y. Tunes,
Feb. 11, 1996, at 8 (reporting that "Mexico looks pretty good over the next 12 to 36
months"); John L. Manzella, Credit Mexico for Staying the Right Course, Christian Si.
Monitor, Sept. 20, 1995, at 19 (praising the Mexican economy for rebounding well
from the January 1995 crisis). But see Keith Bradsher, Mexico: Absent from the White
House Crisis List, N.Y. Tunes, Nov. 10, 1995, at D2 (forecasting a more serious crisis
in winter 1995).
38. Naim, supra note 24, at 112; see Camdessus Address, supra note 24, at 4.
39. See Representative James A. Leach, Address Before the Institute of Interna-
tional Bankers Annual Washington Conference (Mar. 6, 1995), in Currency: News
from the Comm. on Banking and Financial Services (U.S. House of Representatives,
Wash. D.C.), Mar. 6, 1995, at 5 (on file with the Fordham Law Review) [hereinafter
Currency]. Rep. Leach stated:
At a time when the United States may be increasingly disinclined to take
on new financial obligations and when the international community lacks
the resources or international arrangements to carry the burden, establish-
ing techniques for governments to reduce or renegotiate debts in an or-
derly way rather than reaching for patchwork bailouts may be crucial to
maintaining economic stability.
Id.
40. The G-7 consists of the United States, Japan, Germany, France, the United
Kingdom, Italy, and Canada. Bob Davis, G-7 Summit Expected to Boost Support for
Proposals to Help Insolvent Nations, Wall. St. J., June 13, 1995, at A4.
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15-16, 1995, world leaders offered two proposals.41 The first proposal
calls for the creation of an Emergency Financing Mechanism ("EFM")
that would entail the doubling of the General Arrangements to Bor-
row ("GAB"), 42 which currently stand at about $26.6 billion.43 This
proposal would provide the IMF with approximately $50 billion to
loan the next time a country faces a liquidity crisis44 similar to Mex-
ico's.45 This fund would function like a domestic lender of last resort
to ensure investors that their capital would be protected against sud-
den economic shifts. 4 6 Investors, relying on the presence of this insti-
tution to protect their capital, would not panic and withdraw their
investments from a country during a period of financial stress.47
The second proposal suggests the creation of an International
Bankruptcy Agency ("IBA") within which a country facing a liquidity
crisis can renegotiate its debts with its creditors. This forum would
41. Id.
42. For an extensive discussion of the GAB and the EFM proposal, see infra part
III.B.
43. Halifax, supra note 24, at CRS-1; see A Modest Proposal, Economist, June 10,
1995, at 19, 21. In its most recent statement on the matter, the Group of Ten ("G-10")
agreed to support the establishment of a "parallel financing arrangement" to comple-
ment the GAB. Industrial Nations Agree to Double Crisis Resources, Strengthen Sur-
veillance, BNA's Daily Rep. for Executives, Oct. 11, 1995, at C196. In the United
States, Congress has resisted the proposal. David R. Francis, G-7's Plans for Bailout
Fund Hits a GOP Roadblock, Christian Sci. Monitor, June 19, 1995, at 1.
The G-10 members are the United States, the United Kingdom, Belgium, Nether-
lands, Sweden, France, Italy, Germany, Canada and Japan. Edwards, supra note 8, at
72.
44. Liquidity is defined as an entity's ability to "convert [its] assets into cash."
Black's Law Dictionary 931 (6th ed. 1990). A country suffers a liquidity crisis when it
does not have sufficient currency immediately available to meet the demands of its
creditors. See Sachs, supra note 2, at 5.
45. See Halifax, supra note 24, at CRS-5.
46. See infra part III.B.2.
47. See infra part III.B.2.
48. Davis, supra note 40, at A4; Martin Wolf, On Sovereign Bankruptcies, Fin.
Times, May 15, 1995, at 22.
For other proposals supporting the establishment of a bankruptcy agency, see Ben-jamin J. Cohen, Developing-Country Debt: A Middle Way 30-35 (Essays in Int'l Fin.
No. 173, 1989) [hereinafter A Middle Way]; see John Williamson, International Mone-
tary Reform and the Prospects for Economic Development, in Fragile Finance: Re-
thinking the International Monetary System 86, 93 (Jan Joost Teunissen ed., 1992);
Leonard M. Salter, An International Bankruptcy Code: Has the Time Arrived?, 10
Com. Law Bull. 21, *1 (1995) (on file with the Fordham Law Review) [hereinafter
International Bankruptcy Code]. For a more limited bankruptcy agency proposal, see
David Suratgar, The International Financial System and the Management of the Inter-
national Debt Crisis, in International Borrowing: Negotiating and Structuring Inter-
national Debt Transactions 493, 497 (Daniel D. Bradlow ed., 2d ed. 1986) (proposing
the appointment of an "ombudsman" to act as a referee in a debt workout).
Others supporting this proposal are Representative Jim Leach, Chairman of the
House Banking and Financial Institutions Committee, see Currency, supra note 39, at
5 ("One suggestion that I believe should be explored is the feasibility of creating an
international insolvency or bankruptcy process for nation-states to resolve situations
similar to that which occurred in Mexico."), Michel Camdessus, Managing Director of
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administer debtor-oriented provisions similar to those found in U.S.
Bankruptcy Code Chapter 9 ("Chapter 9").49 Proponents of this sug-
gestion have called on the IMF to administer this forum.5 0
This Note argues that the second proposal is the preferable solu-
tion.5 A bankruptcy agency, not an emergency fund, is the more ef-
fective method for providing the fast, decisive action required to
counter the extraordinary speed with which creditors can relocate
their money worldwide.Y Part I of this Note employs the Mexican
crisis as a case study to illustrate the vulnerability of sovereign debtors
and the international financial system as a whole to speculative credi-
tor panics. Part H discusses Chapter 9 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code
and the protections it provides domestic municipalities against specu-
lative creditor panics. Part III then explores both the IBA proposal,
including the key Chapter 9 provisions it might administer, and the
proposal to establish the EFM. Part IV compares both proposals in
light of three primary factors53 and argues that the IBA proposal is
more effective than the EFM proposal. This part also contends that
the IMF should organize the bankruptcy agency and, following the
model of the World Bank,s establish the agency as a separate affiliate
the IMF, see Camdessus Address, supra note 24, at *6. and Jeffrey Sachs. Professor of
International Trade at Harvard University. Sachs, supra note 2, at 18.
James Hurlock offers a third alternative to the MBA and EFM. Rather than an
international forum to handle debt restructuring, he proposes that debtor and creditor
nations should submit their disputes to the United States and English legal systems,
countries with sophisticated bankruptcy codes and commercial laws. See James B.
Hurlock, The Way Ahead for Sovereign Debt, 14 Int'l Fin. L Rev. 10, 12 (1995).
Choice of law clauses in debtor/creditor loan documents most often point to Ameri-
can or British law. Id. Both countries should open their courts to resolve disputes
between sovereign debtors and creditors while closing their courts to creditors who
seek to undermine the reorganization process. Id. This would require an amendment
to their foreign sovereign immunity laws. In the United States, the Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act could be amended to immunize the property of a foreign state from
attachment if a rogue creditor defied the decision of a majority of similarly-situated
creditors who had negotiated a debt readjustment with a sovereign debtor. Id.
A fourth proposal offered is for the establishment of an International Bond-
holder's Corporation. William R. Cline, International Debt Reexamined 482 (1995).
This organization would insure international bonds issued by developing countries in
exchange for the payment of a premium. Id.
49. See Stephen A. Silard, International Law and the Conditions for Order in Inter-
national Finance: Lessons of the Debt Crisis, 23 Int'l Law. 963, 971 (1989) [hereinafter
Lessons of the Debt Crisis] (suggesting the international implementation of proce-
dures similar to those found in Chapter 9); infra part II.
50. See Camdessus Address, supra note 24, at 6; Jim Leach, Country Going Bank-
rupt? Call the IMF, Wall. St. J., Apr. 10, 1995, at A20 [hereinafter Call the IMF];
Sachs, supra note 2, at 22; infra part IV.B.
51. While the two proposals are not mutually exclusive, the creation of a bank-
ruptcy agency should make the EFM dispensable.
52. See infra part IV.A.
53. The factors are: (1) the mechanism's ability to respond quickly and decisively
to creditor panics; (2) the mechanism's ability to minimize moral hazard; and (3) the
mechanism's ability to respond to multiple creditor panics. See infra part IV.A.
54. For a background of the World Bank, see infra note 416.
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under the IMF umbrella. This Note concludes that an urgent need
exists for the international community to establish procedures to man-
age the next "post-modem" crisis and that the IBA proposal is the
most effective management solution.
I. INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL VULNERABILITY: THE MEXICAN
CASE STUDY
This part uses the Mexican crisis as a case study to highlight broader
trends in international finance which demonstrate that the Mexican
crisis is a harbinger of future crises. After discussing the causes of the
crisis and the subsequent United States-sponsored bailout, this part
explores the vulnerability of other nations to the spontaneous capital
flight that Mexico suffered. Finally, this part concludes that estab-
lished international procedures to aid countries in financial distress
are inadequate to address speculative creditor panics that can result
from heavy short-term capital investment.
A. The Causes of the Crisis
The seeds of the 1995 crisis were sown in 1988 when Mexico initi-
ated an economic adjustment strategy to limit inflation, 5 which stood
at an annual rate of 160%.56 Among the economic strategies adopted
to achieve this were: (1) tight fiscal policies; 57 (2) the restructuring of
the external debt;58 (3) the liberalization of industrial regulations to
enhance competitiveness; 59 and (4) the implementation of a "crawling
55. See Patricia A. Wertman, The Mexican Economy under the Salinas Administra-
tion, 4 Mexico Trade & L. Rep. 9, 9 (1994) [hereinafter Salinas Administration]. The
rate of inflation is defined as the percentage rate of change in the general price level,
the measure of the purchasing power of a currency, from one period to the next.
Robert E. Hall & John B. Taylor, Macroeconomics 59 (3d ed. 1991). Inflation reduces
the purchasing power of currency.
56. International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook 90 (May 1995) [here-
inafter Outlook].
57. See Salinas Administration, supra note 55, at 9. The belt-tightening measures
included a reduction in marginal tax rates, strict control over non-interest expendi-
tures, and a reduction in interest rate payments through a restructuring of the exter-
nal debt. Outlook, supra note 56, at 90.
58. See Salinas Administration, supra note 55, at 10-11. In contrast to 1985, when
domestic government debt was valued at 28.8% of nominal gross domestic product
and external debt represented 68% of the nominal gross domestic product, in 1988
these figures had been reduced to 11.9% and 31.5% respectively. Id. Reducing the
external debt in this manner benefitted Mexico by reducing the level of their interest
payments on the debt.
59. See Naim, supra note 24, at 116. Mexican authorities freed interest rates, re-
moved credit controls and lending restrictions, and abolished reserve requirements
and mandatory liquidity ratios. Outlook, supra note 56, at 90. In addition, to spur
trade competitiveness, Mexico unilaterally cut its import tariffs and eased restrictions
on foreign investment and foreign ownership of businesses in Mexico. Id. at 91.
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peg" 60 system that fixed the peso to the dollar to stabilize the value of
the peso and to inhibit its chronic inflationary tendencies.6
These policies achieved success. In the early 1990s inflation fell
from 160% to single digits and the gross domestic product ("GDP")6
grew at a faster pace.63 The United States rewarded Mexico for its
successful economic turnaround by approving the North American
Free Trade Agreement ("NAFTA").1 In addition, private investors
showered Mexico with credit totalling nearly $60 billion over a four-
year period, lifting the Bank of Mexico's international reserves from
$6.5 billion at the end of 1989 to $25.5 billion by the end of 1993.6
This tremendous investment, however, had a downside. While it
was generating prosperity in the early 1990s, it was also masking the
gravity of Mexico's current account deficit,6 which in 1994 stood at
about $29.4 billion.67 The deficit in the current account resulted from
the large increase in private spending that followed the reduction in
60. A crawling peg fixes the value of a nation's currency to that of another, while
letting it gradually depreciate at preannounced rates. See id. at 90. Mexico, by insti-
tuting the crawling peg and fixing the exchange rate to that of the dollar, hoped to
force its inflation rate to converge with the lower rate of inflation in the United
States. See Humphrey, supra note 33, at 184-85. In 1991, the Mexican authorities, to
allow more flexibility in their exchange rate, added an intervention band within which
the currency could fluctuate. Outlook, supra note 56, at 90. The ceiling of the band
was allowed to depreciate at predetermined rates. let
61. See Naim, supra note 24, at 116; William Cline, Managing International Debt:
How One Big Battle Was Won, Economist, Feb. 18, 1995, at 17 [hereinafter Big Battle].
62. GDP is derived by subtracting the value of a nation's contribution to produc-
tive services overseas from gross national product ("GNP"). Hall & Taylor, supra
note 55, at 42. GNP is "the value, at current market prices, of all final goods and
services produced within some period by a nation." Paul A. Samuelson & William D.
Nordhaus, Economics 973 (13th ed. 1989).
63. Outlook, supra note 56, at 91. GDP rose from an average growth of 0.5% a
year between 1985 and 1988 to 3.5% between 1989 and 1992. Id. The fiscal balance
which stood at a 12.5% of nominal GDP deficit in 1988, improved to a 0.5% surplus in
1992. Salinas Administration, supra note 55, at 10.
64. See Outlook, supra note 56, at 91. NAFTA is a comprehensive trilateral free
trade agreement between the United States, Canada, and Mexico. David R. Purnell,
1993 International Trade Update: The GATT and NAFTA, 73 Neb. L. Rev. 211,220
(1994). NAFTA was approved by the House of Representatives on November 17,
1993 and by the Senate on November 20, 1993. George W. Grayson, The North
American Free Trade Agreement: Regional Community and the New World Order
219 (1995).
65. Outlook, supra note 56, at 91.
66. The current account balance is a calculation of a nation's balance of payments
with regard to merchandise and services that are imported and exported. Samuelson
& Nordhaus, supra note 62, at 966. A balance of international payments is "a state-
ment showing all a nation's transactions with the rest of the world for a given period."
Id. A deficit in the current account is registered when a country's total imports ex-
ceeds total exports.
67. Patricia A. Wertman, Mexico's 1995 Economic Program and fie IMF, 5 Mex-
ico Trade & L. Rep. 7, 8 (1995) [hereinafter 1995 Economic Program]. In 1992 and
1993, Mexico's current account deficit averaged about 822 billion annually. William R.
Cline, International Debt Reexamined 458 (1995).
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inflation and increase in domestic and foreign credit. 68 Furthermore,
although the "crawling peg" system was initially a valid way to fight
inflation, 69 the peg contributed to the current account deficit by over-
valuing the peso7" and thereby artificially increased the price of Mexi-
can exports and reduced the price of imports.7' The combination of
the extensive borrowing and the crawling peg caused the current ac-
count deficit to balloon from about 2.5% of GDP between 1988 and
1989 to 6.75% in 1992.72
To subsidize its current account deficit, Mexico relied on portfolio
investors to purchase its short-term bonds.73 Portfolio investment,
composed primarily of purchases of stocks and bonds, however, is
more volatile than direct investment.74 Mexico, cognizant of the vola-
tility of the short-term capital, hoped to prevent capital flight through
the government's continued attractiveness to foreign investors.75 The
government, despite the dangerously increasing current account defi-
cit, projected that as Mexico's competitiveness improved and interna-
tional treaties increased access to foreign markets, exports would rise
and Mexico's dependence on foreign capital would subside.76
In 1994, however, Mexico suffered a series of untimely international
and domestic setbacks which caused investors to rethink their invest-
ments and jeopardized the sustainability of Mexico's spending poli-
cies.77 Internationally, the strong economic expansion in the United
States and other industrial countries provided a more attractive in-
vestment option.78 Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan si-
multaneously tightened economic conditions in the United States by
hiking United States interest rates, thereby decreasing the supply of
68. See Outlook, supra note 56, at 91. Between 1989 and 1992, total imports grew
at an average annual rate of 24%, exceeding the pace of non-oil exports while private
savings fell by 10% of GDP. Id.
69. Rudiger Dornbusch & Alejandro Werner, Mexico: Stabilization, Reform, and
No Growth, Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, at 253, 281 (1994).
70. See Jeffrey Sachs et al., The Collapse of the Mexican Peso: What Have We
Learned? 4 (1995) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Fordham Law Review).
The peso effectively appreciated more than 60% from the end of 1987 to the end of
1992. Outlook, supra note 56, at 91. Because Mexico had a higher rate of inflation
than the United States, the crawling peg system contributed to this overvaluation.
Unlike a free-floating exchange regime, where the peso would have depreciated and
"equaliz[ed] prices between the two countries," the peso soon became overvalued in
relation to the dollar in a peg regime. Humphrey, supra note 33, at 184-85.
71. See Pool & Stamos, supra note 7, at 30-31.
72. Outlook, supra note 56, at 91.
73. Naim, supra note 24, at 113. Between 1989 and 1993, Mexico sold approxi-
mately $20 billion in bonds. See Cline, supra note 67, at 450.
74. See Naim, supra note 24, at 114. Direct foreign investment ventures include a
multinational corporation buying or establishing a factory in the foreign country or
investing in a mine or a plantation. See id. at 124.
75. Id. at 117.
76. Id. at 118.
77. See Outlook, supra note 56, at 93.
78. Id.
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available credit for foreign investment. 79 Domestically, a sequence of
political disturbances, including the first Chiapas rebellion on January
1, 19940 and the assassination of presidential candidate Colosio on
March 23, 1994, fostered political uncertainty and caused the large
capital investments that followed NAFIA to dry up, dropping interna-
tional reserves by $11 billion after the assassination."
A tighter monetary policy at this juncture could have reduced the
size of the current account deficit in early 1994 and an earlier widen-
ing of the intervention band, within which the peso floated,82 could
have assured the markets that the authorities were committed to
maintaining the crawling peg regime and would moderately, rather
than drastically, devalue the peso. 3 The Mexican government, how-
ever, believed that the economic problems were political in origin and
hoped that a stabilization of the political situation would calm the
markets.' Consequently, Mexico failed to react adequately to the
changing economic climate and its own economic jeopardy. President
Salinas, eager to allay investors' fears of a devaluation, swapped about
$13 billion in private-sector holdings of cetes, short-term bonds in-
dexed to the peso, for tesobonos, short-term bonds indexed to the dol-
lar but repayable in pesos.s This swap benefitted investors because
the burden of currency risk shifted from private foreign investors to
the Mexican government-the Mexican government was now obliged
to pay the full dollar value of the bonds regardless of the prevailing
value of the peso.86
The Mexican central bank was not politically independent enough
to voice a dissenting opinion and thus followed the government's
agenda.s7 The United States, because of its preoccupation with Rus-
79. Naim, supra note 24, at 113.
80. See Tn Golden, Mexican Troops Battling Rebels; Toll at Least 57, N.Y. Tunes,
Jan. 3, 1995, at Al. The Zapatista Army of National Liberation, whose goal was to
improve the position of the Mexican poor, incited the rebellion. lit at Al, A9. The
rebellion was timed to coincide with the effective date of NAFrA. kaL at Al.
81. Outlook, supra note 56, at 93. The Mexican crisis renewed the debate over the
wisdom of NAFTA. David E. Sanger, Reopening Old Battles, N.Y. Times, Jan. 20,
1995, at Al, A20.
82. See supra note 60 for a discussion of the intervention band.
83. See Outlook, supra note 56, at 96.
84. Naim, supra note 24, at 118-19 (stating that the Salinas Administration be-
lieved that political shocks, like the Chiapas rebellion, were scaring away investors).
Because 1994 was an election year and the Mexican ruling party, the Partido Revolu-
cionario Institutional, was facing its most difficult challenge from the opposition in 65
years, austere economic reforms would have been political suicide. Marc Levinson,
How It All Went South, Newsweek, Mar. 27, 1995, at 32, 33 ("A strong peso meant
cheap Buicks and bluejeans, and happy consumers were vital if candidate Zedillo was
to [win the election].").
85. Outlook, supra note 56, at 93.
86. Magda Kornis, Peso Crisis: Financial Crisis in Mexico, 5 Mexico Trade and L
Rep. 5, 5 (1995).
87. See Naim, supra note 24, at 115 ("This demonstrates that in [Mexico,] where
personalities count more than institutions, laws are not enough.")
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sia's economic reforms and the Uruguay Round of GATT, was not
vigilantly monitoring Mexico's economic health.88 The IMF did not
respond either; Mexico was no longer under close IMF supervision
because its last loan from the IMF expired in May 1993.89 For months
before the crisis, Mexico did not release any official information about
its international reserve levels, capital flow trends, or short-term debt
obligations.90 Without anyone to sound the warning that Mexico was
recklessly importing goods and that its currency was overvalued, for-
eign investors blindly pumped dollars into the economy, aggravating
the Mexican peso's overvaluation. 91
Shortly after the inauguration of President Zedillo on December 1,
1994,92 renewed political turbulence coupled with rumors about a pos-
sible devaluation of the peso sparked a capital flight which led to a
rapid loss of $3.5 billion in reserves. 93 On December 20, 1994, Mexico
announced a 12.7% devaluation of the peso94 which aggravated the
capital flight, causing international reserves to fall to $10.5 billion.95
One day later, after an additional loss of reserves of $4 billion, the
Mexican government allowed the peso to float to protect its exchange
reserves.
96
88. See id. at 120. Mexico had fostered a robust image of its economy during the
Congressional debate over the passage of NAFTA in 1993. Id.
The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ("GATr") is a multinational docu-
ment which outlines the rules of conduct of trade and whose objective is to eliminate
trade barriers. See A.I. MacBean & P.N. Snowden, International Institutions in Trade
and Finance 63 (Policy Studies Institute: Studies in Economics Vol. 18, 1981).
89. 1995 Economic Program, supra note 67, at 8.
90. Naim, supra note 24, at 120.
91. See id. Some controversy exists as to whether the Clinton Administration was
warned of the crisis prior to the devaluation. CIA reports in July 1994 indicated that
Mexican foreign reserves were being depleted in order to prop up an overvalued
peso. David E. Sanger & Anthony DePalma, On Both Sides of the Border, Peso Ills
Were Long Ignored, N.Y. Times, Jan. 24, 1995, at Al, A9 [hereinafter Peso Ills]. Even
in 1993, reports indicated that a devaluation was likely to occur in Mexico. See Ste-
phen Fidler & Damian Fraser, Dark Cloud of Devaluation Gathers Over Mexico, Fin.
Times, Feb. 24, 1993, at 6. The Clinton Administration, however, has denied prior
knowledge of the likelihood of a devaluation. R. Jeffrey Smith & Clay Chandler, Peso
Crisis Caught U.S. by Surprise, Wash. Post, Feb. 13, 1995, at Al, A16.
92. President Zedillo was elected on August 17, 1994. Smith and Chandler, supra
note 91, at A16.
93. Outlook, supra note 56, at 94; see also Richard Lapper et al., Equity and Debt
Markets Suffer, Fin. Times, Dec. 23, 1994, at 6 (describing the capital flight in Mexico).
94. Mexico Financial Crisis, supra note 21, at CRS-3. The devaluation was in-
tended to rectify the overvaluation of the peso, thus reducing the price of Mexican
exports and increasing the costs of imports. See id. at CRS-2 to -3.
95. Outlook, supra note 56, at 94.
96. Tim Golden, Mexico Will Float Its Battered Currency, N.Y. Times, Dec. 22,
1994, at D1. By floating the peso, the Mexican government allowed the markets to
determine the value of the peso. See Edwards, supra note 8, at 684 (describing the
effects of a floating exchange regime). Because of the reduced demand for the peso,
it dropped in value. See Golden, supra, at Dl. The United States and Canada, Mex-
ico's NAFTA partners, quickly arranged $7 billion in emergency credits for Mexico.
Id.
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Investors were angered. Mexican Finance Minister Jaime Serra
Puche, a few days earlier, had promised that the peso would not be
devalued. 7 Concerned that Mexico would not be able to finance its
short-term tesobonos debt, on which the 1995 payments exceeded
reserves by $23 billion, foreign investors punished Mexico by refusing
to roll over their maturing tesobonos. 9 Sixteen billion dollars worth
of these tesobonos were due to mature in early 1995.91 Because of its
greatly diminished reserves, the Zedillo Administration was unable to
meet the redemption demands of all the bondholders.1 °
B. The Controversial Bailout
In December 1994, Mexico suffered a liquidity rather than a sol-
vency crisis.1 1 The Mexican crisis in 1995 was not a replay of the
crisis in 1982.102 Although in 1982 Mexico's economic problems were
largely structural, including such characteristics as a closed economy
and a dependency on oil as its primary export, by 1995 Mexico had
opened its economy and liberalized its trading policies.10 3 Thus,
although Mexico had sufficient incoming oil revenue to honor the ran-
dom repayment demands of its bondholders, Mexico did not have the
resources at hand to redeem immediately the maturing bonds from a
panicking multitude of bondholders.104
Given the long-term health of the Mexican economy, President
Clinton would not allow Mexico to fail. The Clinton Administration
feared a repeat of the 1982 Latin American collapse, when a number
97. See Anthony DePalna, With Peso Freed, Mexican Currency Drops 20% More,
N.Y. Tunes, Dec. 23, 1994, at Al, D4. Later, President Zedillo forced the resignation
of Minister Puche. Sanger & DePalma, supra note 91, at A9.
98. Sachs, supra note 2, at 18.
99. See Salinas Largely to Blame, Latin Am. Regional Reps., Jan. 19, 1995, at 6.
100. See id.
101. See, e.g., Big Battle, supra note 61, at 17 (arguing that the Mexican crisis re-
sulted from illiquidity, rather than a fundamental inability to pay its debts); Stephen
Fidler, A Clearer View Now of Mexico's Debt Troubles, Fin. Tunes, Jan. 14-15, 1995, at
3 (stating that U.S. officials have argued that Mexico was a liquidity, not a solvency
issue); Going With The Flows, Economist, Jan. 28, 1995, at 74 (referring to Mexico's
current liquidity crisis); Mexico Financial Crisis, supra note 21, at CRS-1 (same).
For a definition of liquidity, see supra note 44. The general definition of "solvency"
that the commentators above employed is the "ability to make ultimate payment of
obligations then owed from assets then owned." Black's Law Dictionary 1394 (6th ed.
1990). But see 11 U.S.C. § 101(32)(c) (1994) (characterizing a municipality as insol-
vent when the municipality is not paying its debts as they come due or is unable to pay
its debts as they come due).
102. See Cline, supra note 67, at 499; For a discussion of the 1982 crisis, see supra
note 21.
103. See Cline, supra note 67, at 499; Mexico Financial Crisis, supra note 21, at
CRS-3. While in 1982, oil accounted for 75% of exports, the Mexican economy in
1995 was more diversified and oil only counted for 36% of exports. Id.
104. See Cline, supra note 67, at 499 ("[T]he problem this time was one of cash flow
and, in particular, the rollover of some $17 billion in dollar-indexed treasury bonds
(tesobonos) held by foreigners.").
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of Latin American countries, led by Mexico, were simultaneously in
economic trouble.105 If Mexico was forced to impose exchange con-
trols or a moratorium on debt repayment, the investors who suffered
as a result would reconsider their investment in other developing
economies in Latin America, possibly precipitating a more widespread
crisis. 0 6 Furthermore, should Mexico fail, protectionism would resur-
face.1"7 This development would pose a severe setback both for the
Latin American countries that had struggled to grow out of their debt
under the Brady Plan,1 8 and for the United States, which had a vested
economic interest in the health of these economies. 10 9 Finally, and
perhaps most importantly, American investors in Mexican stocks and
bonds would suffer a potential loss estimated at about $8-$10
billion."0
President Clinton, upon learning about Congress' reluctance to dis-
burse aid to Mexico quickly, abandoned the $40 billion request and
ordered a policy switch to "Plan B."' Plan B was an alternative fi-
nancing package based on a $20 billion infusion from the United
States' Exchange Stabilization Fund ("ESF")." 2
105. See Graham et al., supra note 1, at 4; Zanny Minton-Beddoes, Why the IMF
Needs Reform, 74 Foreign Aff. 123, 125-26 (1995).
106. See Graham et al., supra note 1, at 4.
107. Mexico was considered a "test case" for the proponents of privatization in the
former state-managed economies of Latin America. Manzella, supra note 37, at 19.
But see U.S. and International Response to the Mexican Financial Crisis. Hearings
Before the House Comm. on Banking and Financial Services, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. 69,
72 (1995) [hereinafter Nader Testimony] (statement of Ralph Nader, consumer advo-
cate) (arguing that precisely because the test case failed, the United States should cut
its losses and not bail out Mexico). For an in-depth discussion on privatization in
developing countries, see Kim Reisman, Note, The World Bank and the IMF: At the
Forefront of World Transformation, 60 Fordham L. Rev. S349 (1992).
108. The Brady plan was a voluntary debt reduction program designed to reduce
Latin American debt by allowing sovereign debtors to exchange bank debt for bond
debt at a discount of either the principal or interest rate. Rory MacMillan, The Next
Sovereign Debt Crisis, 31 Stan. J. Int'l L. 305, 313-15 (1995). By 1994, 18 Brady Deals
had forgiven $61 billion in debt, Big Battle, supra note 61, at 18, and had effectively
ended the debt crisis. Cline, supra note 67, at 270.
109. See infra note 154.
110. Louis Uchitelle, U.S. Losses in Mexico Assessed, N.Y. Times, Dec. 26, 1994, at
55.
111. See Graham et al., supra note 1, at 4. This announcement immediately
boosted sagging investor confidence and rallied Latin American financial markets.
Paul Lewis, Wall Street and Its Latin Counterparts Respond with Relief and a Wave of
Higher Prices, N.Y. Times, Feb. 1, 1995, at A16.
112. See Graham et al., supra note 1, at 4. Under Plan B, the United States pro-
vided support in three forms: short-term swaps with the Federal Reserve where dol-
lars were exchanged for pesos; medium-term currency swaps with maturities of three
to five years; and guaranteed securities with maturities of five to ten years. See U.S.
and International Response to the Mexican Financial Crisis: Hearings Before the
House Comm. on Banking and Financial Services, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. 375, 376(1995) (memorandum from Walter Dellinger, Assistant Attorney General, to Edward
S. Knight, General Counsel to the Treasury Department) [hereinafter Dellinger
Memo]. Mexico was allowed to draw on the $20 billion over the following 12 months.
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Twenty billion dollars, however, was not enough. Additional funds
were necessary to demonstrate to foreign investors that Mexico had
the financial capability to honor its bonds and restore investor confi-
dence in Mexico. 113 The Clinton Administration turned to the BIS
and the IMF, two supporters who had earlier pledged to lend Mexico
$5 billion and $7.8 billion, respectively.'14 The Clinton staff asked An-
drew Crockett, the General Manager of the BIS, to increase the BIS
contribution to Mexico from $5 billion to $10 billion.115 Crockett, re-
luctant to promise such a large sum of money, only agreed to consider
the request."16
The Clinton staff next contacted the IM. After heavy negotiations,
Michel Camdessus, Managing Director of the IMF, approved a $17.8
billion loan to Mexico, the largest loan the IMP had issued in its fifty-
one year history. 1 7 Supplementing this huge commitment by the
IMF, Canada agreed to lend $1.5 billion and international banks
agreed to lend $3 billion."'
President Clinton, on February 1, 1995, announced the promised aid
from the BIS and the IMF 1 9 Officials at the BIS and the IMF were
See Mexican Bailout a Relief But Hard Year is Feared, LDC Debt Rep., Feb. 6, 1995,
at 1, *3 (on file with the Fordham Law Review) [hereinafter Hard Year]. Mexico, in
return, established an "oil facility" at the New York Federal Reserve in which it was
obligated to deposit about $7.5 billion in annual earnings from oil exports and from
which the United States and other bailout creditors may draw upon should Mexico
default. Id But see U.S. and International Response to the Merican Financial Crisis:
Hearings Before the House Comm. on Banking and Financial Services, 104th Cong.,
1st Sess. 269, 271 (1995) [hereinafter Whalen Statement] (letter from Christopher
Whalen, Chief Financial Officer of Legal Research International, Inc.) (stating that
Mexican oil reserves are actually unavailable as collateral on the bailout because most
of the dollar revenues from oil sales are already pledged to pay other debts).
The Exchange Stabilization Fund was originally established to stabilize the United
States dollar and foreign currencies. See 31 U.S.C. § 5302(b) (1988). To this end, it is
employed to "buy and sell foreign currency, enter into swap arrangements with for-
eign countries ... and guarantee obligations of foreign governments." U.S. and Inter-
national Response to the Mexican Financial Crisis: Hearings Before the House Comm.
on Banking and Financial Services, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. 355, 355 (1995) [hereinafter
Stabilization Fund]. "Subject to the approval of the President.. .[the ESF] is under
the exclusive control of the Secretary [of the Treasury]." 31 U.S.C. § 5302(a)(2)
(1988). The ESF, at the time of the Mexican crisis, had assets totalling about $37
billion, $29.5 billion of which was available for Mexico. Stabilization Fund, supra, at
355.
113. See Graham et al., supra note 1, at 4.
114. See supra note 26.
115. See Graham et a, supra note 1, at 4.
116. See id.
117. Id. For a profile on Michel Camdessus, see Jeff Gerth & Elaine Sciolino,
LM.E Head" He Speaks, and Money Talks, N.Y. Tunes, Apr. 2,1996, at Al.
118. Id The commercial banks were J.P. Morgan and Citibank. Hard Year, supra
note 112, at *4.
119. David E. Sanger, Clinton Offers $20 Billion to Mexico for Peso Rescue" Action
Sidesteps Congress, N.Y. Times, Feb. 1, 1995, at Al [hereinafter $20 Billion to
Mexico].
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outraged. 2 ° Officials at the BIS felt that the United States, in bad
faith, had treated the proposed $10 billion BIS loan as a foregone con-
clusion, rather than as a proposal the BIS had only agreed to con-
sider.12' At the IMF, parties opposed to the loan argued that IMF
funds were being used to bail out risk-taking American mutual and
pension fund managers. 122 Opponents were shocked by the size of the
IMF contribution, which was nearly seven times larger than Mexico's
quota 123 and three and one-half times more than the IMF had ever
lent in its history.12 4 They felt that such excessive lending would cre-
ate a moral hazard 25 and lending precedents that the IMF would be
120. Graham et al., supra note 1, at 4. The prevailing sentiment internationally was
that the Mexican crisis was a regional rather than a systemic problem, which the
United States should handle alone. George Graham & Stephen Fidler, Europeans
Angry at U.S. over Mexico, Fn. Tunes, Feb. 4-5, 1995, at 3. The United States, by
seeking large sums of foreign aid, was irresponsibly avoiding its regional obligations.
George Graham, Ministers Put Mexico Rift Behind Them, Fn. Tunes, Feb. 6, 1995, at
5 [hereinafter Mexico Rift].
121. Graham & Fidler, supra note 120, at 3. In fact, the BIS had originally envi-
sioned its $5 billion as a short-term "bridge" loan until a larger IMF loan was ar-
ranged. See Graham et al., supra note 1, at 4. Later, at the BIS, Hans Tietmeyer, the
Bundesbank president, said that the $10 billion had been approved. Id. It was to be,
however, more of a "bookkeeping exercise" than an actual loan. Id. Mexico could
include the $10 billion as part of its bailout package, but the funds would not actually
be transferred to Mexico. The money would remain in the central banks. Id.
122. See Graham et al., supra note 1, at 4. In the voting to approve the loan, six of
the IMF's 24 Directors abstained from the vote. Graham & Fidler, supra note 120, at
3. This was a significant mark of their displeasure given that almost all IMF board
decisions are reached by consensus. Id.
123. See 1995 Economic Program, supra note 67, at 8. Current access rules to the
General Resources Account allow a country to borrow 100% of its quota with a cu-
mulative limit of 300%. Id. Mexico's quota was about $2.6 billion and, thus, the IMF
loan was nearly an unprecedented 700% times greater than Mexico's quota. Id.
Quotas are the contributions of IMF members to its General Resources Account.
See Edwards, supra note 8, at 12. The General Resources Account consists of "na-
tional currencies, special drawing rights, and gold." Id. Contributions to the account
by member nations are determined by individual quotas, an amount which roughly
reflects the importance of the nation's currency in the world economy. Daniel D.
Bradlow, The International Monetary Fund: An Overview of its Structure and Func-
tions, in International Borrowing: Negotiating and Structuring International Debt
Transactions 399, 399 (Daniel D. Bradlow ed., 2d ed. 1986).
124. See Graham et al., supra note 1, at 4.
125. The traditional definition of moral hazard, as applied to fire insurance, is:
[T]he risk or danger of the destruction of the insured property by fire, as
measured by the character and interest of the insured owner, his habits as
a prudent and careful man or the reverse, his known integrity or his bad
reputation, and the amount of loss he would suffer by the destruction of
the property or the gain he would make by suffering it to bum and collect-
ing the insurance.
Black's Law Dictionary 719 (6th ed. 1990).
Applied to the context of a sovereign debtor, the term moral hazard denotes the
reduction in the deterrence of future fiscal responsibility caused by the debtor's re-
ceipt of a bailout.
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unable to meet in the future."2 The IMF had always prided itself on
its even-handed treatment of all members. 27 In addition, IMF mem-
ber nations felt that Michel Camdessus and the Clinton Administra-
tion had clandestinely arranged this loan without consulting with IMF
officials. 1' s
Congress' criticism of the bailout echoed that of the IMF officials'
disapproval. Members of Congress also felt they had not been ade-
quately consulted about the use of the Exchange Stabilization
Fund.'29 They believed they should have had the chance to approve
the disbursement of such a large sum of aid. 30 Some Representatives
questioned the wisdom of bailing out Mexico, a country with "a long
and painful past of undisciplined financial mismanagement.' 3' Crit-
ics of the bailout suggested that the true intent of the aid was to bail
out wealthy Wall Street investors. 32  Other critics suggested that
United States intervention was unnecessary because the investors and
the Mexican government, left alone, would work out a mutually ac-
ceptable arrangement themselves. 33 Finally, even those who favored
a bailout supported a multinational effort instead of a bailout where
the United States functioned alone as a "liquidity backstop" when a
global crisis threatened the international financial system.'
126. See Naim, supra note 24, at 128; Jeffrey D. Sachs, Mexican Precedent for
Ukraine, F'm. Tunes, Feb. 17, 1995, at 17 (stating that after the precedent established
in Mexico, the IMF should arrange a similar package for the Ukraine).
127. Naim, supra note 24, at 128; see Greg Ip, Are Taxpayer's on the Hook for G-7's
Plans for Reform?, Fin. Post, June 23, 1995, at 10.
128. See Graham et al., supra note 1, at 4.
129. See Janet Hook & James Gerstenzang, House Passes Bill to Block Bailouts
Similar to Mexico's, L.A. Tunes, July 20, 1995, at D1 (" 'We never had a chance to
vote on the merits of this issue.'" (quoting Rep. Marcy Kaptur (D-Ohio))).
130. See id. For an extensive discussion supporting the power of the President to
disburse the funds under his own foreign affairs authority, see Humphrey, supra note
33, at 181.
131. See, eg., U.S. and International Response to the Mexican Financial Crisis:
Hearings Before the House Comm. on Banking and Financial Services, 104th Cong.,
1st Sess. 215, 215-17 (1995) (statements by Representatives Bob Barr and Carolyn B.
Maloney).
132. See e.g., U.S. and International Response to the Mexican Financial Crisis:
Hearings before the House Comm. on Banking and Financial Services, 104th Cong.,
1st Sess. 180, 182 (1995) [hereinafter Wanniski Testimony] (statement of Jude Wan-
niski, president of Polyonomics, Inc.) ("The people who benefit most from a peso
devaluation.., are those insiders who borrow a great many pesos, sell them for
dollars, and repay them with fewer dollars after the devaluation."); Whalen State-
ment, supra note 112, at 270 ("The proposed $40 billion rescue package ... actually is
a hidden subsidy for Wall Street and Mexico's elite. .. ").
133. See Peter Ackerman & James A. Dom, Dose of Financial Morphine for Mex-
ico, Fn. Tunes, Feb. 15, 1995, at 21; Michael Prowse, The Rescuers, New Republic,
Feb. 27, 1995, at 11, 12.
134. Currency, supra note 39, at 6 (statement of Representative Jim Leach).
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C. The Wider Implications of the Mexican Crisis
A generalized debt crisis similar to that which occurred in the 1980s
is unlikely to occur in the 1990s. 111 Individual countries with signifi-
cant external debt, however, are increasingly likely to suffer liquidity
crises similar to Mexico's. 136 In the 1990s, large volumes of highly mo-
bile international bonds and portfolio investment replaced relatively
stable syndicated bank loans137 to developing economies.13 8 After the
135. See Going With the Flows, supra note 101, at 74 ("Despite Mexico's current
liquidity crisis, the economic fundamentals of the 20 or so emerging economies... are
strong.").
136. See Cline, supra note 67, at 481; International Monetary Fund, World Eco-
nomic Outlook 59 (Oct. 1995); Macillan, supra note 108, at 307-08; Prowse, supra
note 133, at 12; see also Lender of Last Resort, supra note 10, at 1777 (urging a re-
thinking of multilateral responses to a debt crisis given the increased access of devel-
oping countries to global bond and equity mutual funds); Camdessus Address, supra
note 24, at 4 ("Vastly increased financial flows across national borders have also made
countries that participate in international financial markets much more vulnerable to
adverse shifts in market sentiments."); A Modest Proposal, supra note 43, at 19 (stat-
ing that the IMF and World Bank's current purpose and functions do not address the
perils of the present capital markets).
In October 1995, after the Mexican collapse, the United States again faced the pros-
pect of a liquidity crisis in another important trading partner, Japan, whose banks
were burdened with $400 billion worth of bad loans. Keith Bradsher, Fearing Japanese
Bank Frailty, U.S. Agrees to Give Future Help, N.Y. Times, Oct. 17, 1995, at Al, D6.
The United States Federal Reserve took advance precautions, arranging to provide
Japanese financial authorities instantly with billions of dollars in cash should a sudden
cash crisis take place. Id. at Al. The Federal Reserve sought to send an international
message that Japan had the financial capabilities to honor its debt and to prevent a
panic mentality among bank depositors. Id. This arrangement marked the first time
the Federal Reserve took advance precautions to guard against a possible crisis. Id.
The circumstances motivating the precautions taken by the Federal Reserve bore
many resemblances to the situation in Mexico. Troubled Japanese banks, despite
their solvency, did not have sufficient cash at hand to honor their debt obligations to a
panicking multitude of depositors. Id.
137. Syndicated bank loans are devices by which creditors enter into a partnership
to raise large sums of money that they would not otherwise be able to raise on their
own due to regulatory constraints. Derek Asiedu-Akrofi, Sustaining Lender Commit-
ment to Sovereign Debtors, 30 Colum. J. Transnat'l L. 1, 4 (1992). Syndication also
permits creditors to spread the risk of an investment because each creditor is only
committed to a part of the loan. Id.
138. See Cline, supra note 67, at 426-27; Sudarshan Gooptu, Portfolio Investment
Flows to Emerging Markets, in World Bank Discussion Papers: Portfolio Investment
in Developing Countries 45, 46 (Stijn Claessens & Sudarshan Gooptu eds., 1993)
(stating that while on a "global basis, borrowing on international capital markets in-
creased in 1991[,] . . . there was a decline in syndicated bank lending"); Stephen
Zamora, Regulating the Global Banking Network-What Role (If Any) for the IMF?,
62 Fordham L. Rev. 1953, 1965 (1994). For a general discussion about the causes
behind the great increase of private capital to Latin America, see Stephany Griffith-
Jones et al., The Return of Private Capital to Latin America: The Facts, an Analytical
Framework and Some Policy Issues, in Fragile Finance: Rethinking the International
Monetary System 13, 26-32 (Jan Joost Teunissen ed., 1992).
Notably, after the Mexican crisis, the trend has reversed, with new direct invest-
ment now outpacing portfolio investment. See Paul Lewis, Multinationals Raised '95
Investment in 3d World 13%, N.Y. Times, Mar. 13, 1996, at D5.
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Latin American debt crisis in 1982139 exploded the myth that sover-
eign debt was immune from default, commercial banks ceased lending
to developing countries. 1' Instead the banks focussed on protecting
themselves by selling off bad loans through the Brady Plan14' and
debt-for-equity conversions.' 42 The bankers gave way to portfolio in-
vestors, who between 1987 and 1992 poured investment into develop-
ing countries, increasing their presence from $6.2 billion in 1987 to
$37.2 billion in 1992, with an additional increase of $26.9 billion in the
first half of 1993.14 Twenty-five countries, led by Mexico, Argentina,
Brazil, and Venezuela, raised approximately $80 billion in the interna-
tional bond markets.'"
This increased investment in developing countries arouses concern
because investors were not responding to an attractive risk but rather
to the collapse of interest rates in the United States market.'4 5 Amer-
ican investors, motivated by the prospect of high yields, searched for
markets that would enhance the return on their investments.'" In ef-
139. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
140. See Cline, supra note 67, at 426-27.
141. See supra note 108 for a discussion of the Brady Plan.
142. See Cline, supra note 67, at 427. Debt-for-equity swaps are similar to Brady
bonds in that creditor banks sell their bad debt at a discount on the secondary market
to an investor doing business in the debtor state. Daniel H. Cole, Debt-Equity Con-
versions, Debt-for-Nature Swaps, and the Continuing World Debt Crisis, 30 Colum. J.
Transnat'l L. 57, 63 (1992). The debtor state then purchases the debt from the inves-
tor in exchange for either an "interest in some government-owned industry or for its
partial or full dollar value in local currency." Id The investor then invests his pro-
ceeds in local ventures. Id
143. John Williamson, Issues Posed by Portfolio Investment in Developing Corn-
tries, in World Bank Discussion Papers: Portfolio Investment in Developing Coun-
tries 11, 11 (Stijn Claessens & Sudarshan Gooptu eds., 1993).
144. Cline, supra note 67, at 450. Ten Latin American nations increased their bond
issues from $930 million in 1989 to well over $20 billion in 1993. Id. Argentina. Mex-
ico, and Venezuela welcomed the purchases of their bonds and relied on them as an
integral part of their stabilization programs. See id Consequently, the -present value
of Mexico and Argentina's external debt service is approximately one-third of their
respective GDPs, while Venezuela's is nearly two-thirds of its GDP." MacMillan,
supra note 108, at 307.
145. Cline, supra note 67, at 429-30.
146. Naim, supra note 24, at 127. A study by Calvo, Leiderman, and Reinhart
demonstrated that external capital market shifts, including a recession in industrial-
ized countries, rather than internal policy improvement in Latin American countries,
dominated the resurgence of portfolio investment in the early 1990s. Guillermo A.
Calvo et al., Capital Inflows and Real Exchange Rate Appreciation in Latin America,
40 Int'l Monetary Fund Staff Papers 108, 126, 140 (1993). Consequently, "capital in-
flows---especially the 'hot money' variety-may be reversed on short notice, possibly
leading to a domestic financial crisis." Id at 143.
An additional factor behind the large increase in bond investment was the general
belief among investors that bonds were a less risky form of investment than long term
bank credit because of an implicit senior status accorded to bond repayment. See
Cline, supra note 67, at 437. Bonds had an implicit senior status during the 1982 debt
crisis in part because bond repayment was a relatively small portion of a debtor's
entire debt. Id The mistaken assumption among investors in the 1990s was that this
repayment priority would continue. Id at 438. When, however, bonds became the
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fect, a tremendous amount of short-term capital is "sloshing around
the globe in search of the highest return," intensifying the risk of capi-
tal flight in all emerging markets relying on these flows as a source of
funding.147 The speculative nature of short-term capital, coupled with
technological breakthroughs that allow the execution of financial
transactions within seconds, 48 subjects many developing nations to
the risks of harsh, arbitrary, and irrational capital flight by thousands
of anonymous investors. 149
majority rather than the minority form of debt in the 1990s, the implicit senior status
of bonds disappeared. Id.
147. Mark Clayton, World's Economic Structure Shifts, Christian Sci. Monitor, June
28, 1995, at 1, 9.
148. See Paul F. Glaser, The Intersection of Technology and Financial Services, in
Innovation and Technology in the Markets 13, 14 (Daniel R. Siegel ed., 1990); see also
Frank J. Fabozzi & Franco Modigliani, Capital Markets: Institutions and Instruments
692 (1992) (stating that advances in computer technology allow the execution of fi-
nancial transactions within seconds).
149. Naim, supra note 24, at 125; see also Clayton, supra note 147, at 9 ("Mexico is
not the first, and it won't be the last financial crisis aggravated by the increasing
amounts of highly mobile [short-term] capital." (quoting Paul Volcker, former chair-
man of the Federal Reserve Board)).
The growing global use of risky financial instruments intensifies the risk of financial
crisis. See Naim, supra note 24, at 122; G. Bruce Knecht, Derivatives Are Going
Through Crucial Test. A Wave of Lawsuits, Wall. St. J., Oct. 28, 1994, at Al; Carol J.
Loomis, Untangling the Derivatives Mess, Fortune, Mar. 20, 1995, at 50, 50.
Two of the most infamous financial collapses recently precipitated by the trading of
risky and highly speculative derivatives are the bankruptcy in Orange County and the
collapse of Barings. Naim, supra note 24, at 121. In Orange County, the county treas-
urer Robert Citron invested heavily in derivatives and gambled that interest rates
would not rise. "When they did, the county went broke." Id. For a discussion of the
Orange County bankruptcy, see Laura Jereski et al., Bitter Fruit: Orange County,
Mired in Investment Mess, Files for Bankruptcy, Wall St. J., Dec. 7, 1994, at Al. The
Barings collapse was caused by rogue trader Nicholas Leeson who gambled on deriva-
tives whose value depended on the quiescence of the Japanese stock markets. Naim,
supra note 24, at 121-22. When the Japanese stock market declined after the Kobe
earthquake, Barings went bankrupt. Id. at 122; see Sheila C. Bair, Lessons from the
Barings Collapse, 64 Fordham L. Rev. 1, 3-4 (1995).
Both Orange County and Barings "fell victim to an international financial system
that offers sweeping new opportunities [through innovative securities] but also inflicts
immediate, lethal punishments on those who make the wrong calls." Naim, supra note
24, at 121; see also Timothy A. Canova, The Transformation of U.S. Banking and
Finance: From Regulated Competition to Free-Market Receivership, 60 Brook. L. Rev.
1295, 1348-50 (1995) (stating that the dangers of a continuing "free-market" approach
to international finance are evidenced by the failures in Barings, Orange County, and
Mexico).
Derivatives are examples of risky financial instruments. Their values are linked to
underlying assets-stocks, bonds, or financial indexes. Saul S. Cohen, The Challenge
of Derivatives, 63 Fordham L. Rev. 1993,2000 (1995). The performance of the deriva-
tives depends on the performance of the asset in the markets. Id. at 2002. Derivatives
are used to gamble on the markets because the cost to buy derivatives is only a small
fraction of the underlying asset's value. Richard Thomson et al., Rogue Trader,
Greedy Bank: How Barings Found a Young Star and How Both Failed to Cope with
the New, High Speed World of Money, Independent, Mar. 5, 1995, at 1, 2. While gains
from speculation in these investments may be huge, so are the losses. Leslie Wayne,
The Search for Municipal Cowboys, N.Y. Times, Dec. 8, 1994, at D1, D16.
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A speculative capital flight, however, can destroy a developing
economy, negatively affecting those nations with whom the emerging
market has significant economic ties.150 The globalization of securities
markets 1 has introduced unprecedented changes in "how quickly,
how deeply, and how far the shock waves of a crash can be felt" when
investors en masse decide to move their money. 152 Because global
markets are interdependent, "one failure in a global financial market
may affect the entire structure of that market."' 53 Bond lending and
portfolio investment are particularly dangerous because the shifts in
market psychology have a highly contagious effect. This effect is evi-
denced by Latin American investors' "flight to quality" after the Mex-
ican crisis.)54
150. See Naim, supra note 24, at 125-27. Responding to whether a Mexican default
would have created a systemic crisis, a French official noted, "We don't know how the
international markets would have reacted, but in the end, the risk of a default by
Mexico could not be run." Graham et al., supra note 1, at 4.
151. See Michael Gruson, The Global Securities Market: Introductory Remarks,
1987 Colum. Bus. L. Rev. 303, 304; David E. Van Zandt, The Regulatory and Institu-
tional Conditions for an International Securities Market, 32 Va. J. Int'l L- 47, 47 (1991);
Michel V. Hurley, Comment, International Debt and Equity Markets: U.S. Participa-
tion in the Globalization Trend, 8 Emory Int'l L. Rev. 701, 701-02 (1994).
The globalization trend in securities markets exploded in 1984 when international
securities trading increased from a volume of about $110 billion in 1984 to over $227
billion in 1990. Van Zandt, supra, at 57. A number of factors contributed to the
globalization movement: (1) innovative financial instruments that attracted new in-
vestors by simplifying investments; (2) an increased demand for capital among devel-
oping countries and deficit-ridden developed countries corresponding to an increased
supply of investment funds among creditors; (3) deregulation in advanced economies
that facilitated market access; and (4) the volatility of exchange and interest rates
that, as a prudential matter, fueled the need for diversification as an investment strat-
egy. Gruson, supra, at 304-05. For an in-depth historical study of the globalization
movement, see Eric Helleiner, States and the Reemergence of Global Finance (1994).
152. Naim, supra note 24, at 121-22; see Camdessus Address, supra note 24, at 3.
153. Gruson, supra note 151, at 307-08; see International Bankruptcy Code, supra
note 48, at *5 ("In the fluid and integrated world we inhabit, the instability of a major
country like Mexico can have repercussions and reverberations around the world...
."). For a conflicting viewpoint, see later reports stating that although neighboring
economies were hurt by the peso crisis, Latin America Recovering, IMF Says, LA.
Times, Oct. 6, 1995, at D12, there was only a "modest threat to the stability of the
international financial system." Chandler, supra note 6, at Al.
154. Cline, supra note 67, at 502. The United States, in particular, worried about
the effects of Mexico's economic crisis on illegal immigration into the United States.
David E. Sanger, Mexico Crisis Seen Spurring Flow of Aliens, N.Y. Tunes, Jan. 18,
1995, at A3 (reporting that the Clinton Administration predicted an increase of
430,000 illegal immigrants if the Mexican economy was allowed to collapse). The
United States was also concerned about the possible decline of U.S. exports to Mex-
ico, which had grown to $41 billion in 1993. Sen. Tom Daschle, Loan Guarantee For
Mexico, Congressional Press Release, Jan. 30, 1995, at 2 (on file with the Fordham
Law Review). Private economists argued, in defense of the bailout, that hundreds of
thousands of American jobs were dependent on Mexican exports. See Allen R. Myer-
son, Peso's Plunge May Cost Thousands of U.S. Jobs, N.Y. Tunes, Jan. 30, 1995, at D4.
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The Mexican devaluation sparked a capital flight in other countries,
demonstrating a phenomenon dubbed the "Neighborhood Effect."1 55
The "neighborhood" is determined not by geography but rather by
the perceived volatility of a debtor's economy.' 56 Investors typically
cluster groups of countries into certain "neighborhoods" and will treat
them similarly. A perceived threat in one country will apply to the
other countries in that cluster. 157 Consequently, after the Mexican de-
valuation, financial markets from Argentina to Spain to Hong Kong
were weakened, including those in Poland, South Korea, Turkey, Bul-
garia, India, Malaysia, Pakistan, and the Phillipines.158
The Mexican crisis demonstrated that mutual fund investors will
quickly move their money at any sign of risk. 159 It also confirmed
that the "liberalization of international capital flows has created a
world in which the sovereignty of any one nation is surrendered to the
forces of private financial speculation.' 160 This situation stands in
contrast to the 1980s when large commercial bankers were the pri-
mary lenders to developing countries.' 6' The bankers then entered
into direct investment in factories and infrastructure, affording the
debtor governments some leverage in debt renegotiation proceedings
because the bankers were relatively committed to their invest-
ments.' 62 Today, a government relying on large portfolio investment
is at the mercy of the whims of mutual fund managers. 63 As one
commentator noted, "Capital is capable of staging a general political
strike against the policies of any nation state ... by simply voting
against that country's currency and bonds in the private
marketplace."'16
D. The Vacuum in International Financial Management
No international and mutually acceptable procedures are in place to
respond effectively to a speculative capital flight of the magnitude and
speed that occurred in Mexico. 65 One commentator noted, "The
world's financial system has... raced ahead of the institutional infra-
155. Naim, supra note 24, at 125; see Floyd Norris, Mexican Shadow Falls on
Emerging Markets, N.Y. Times, Feb. 1, 1995, at D1.
156. Naim, supra note 24, at 125.
157. Id. at 125-26.
158. Id. at 125; see Michael R. Sesit, Dollar Darwinism: Global Capital Crunch is
Beginning To Punish Some Weak Economies, Wall. St. J., Jan. 12, 1995, at Al, A6.
159. See Naim, supra note 24, at 127.
160. Canova, supra note 149, at 1351-52.
161. See Cline, supra note 67, at 426.
162. See Naim, supra note 24, at 124.
163. Id. at 124-25.
164. Canova, supra note 149, at 1352.
165. "'The speed at which international markets have evolved over the last 25
years has been much faster than the capacity of governments and international orga-
nizations to cope.'" Friedman, supra note 32, at A25 (quoting Mexican President
Ernesto Zedillo).
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structure for crisis management."'" Traditionally, a debtor country
who wished to renegotiate with creditors followed a three-step proce-
dure beginning with the negotiation of a standby arrangement with
the IMF.167 The country then renegotiated with its official creditors in
the Paris Club. 68 The Paris Club will only renegotiate debt when the
debtor country is in a state of "imminent default" and has negotiated
a standby arrangement with the IMF. 169 Finally, the debtor state re-
negotiated with its private commercial creditors in the London
Club.' In the London Club, commercial banks required the debtor
to have first negotiated an IMF standby arrangement and a Paris Club
rescheduling. 7' As a policy matter, both Clubs retain an ad hoc char-
acter for the negotiations to reinforce the exceptional nature of debt
renegotiations.'72
As the crisis in Mexico demonstrated, these traditional ad hoc and
lengthy renegotiation procedures are unsuited to maintain investor
confidence during a speculative capital flight in an era of highly mo-
bile short-term capital. An ability to respond quickly and decisively to
restore confidence in creditors is critical to prevent these panics. The
166. Suratgar, supra note 48, at 495.
167. Alexis Rieffel, The Role of the Paris Club in Managing Debt Problems 2 (Es-
says in Int'l Fmn. No. 161, 1985). The IMF devises standby arrangements in order to
enforce the implementation of economic reforms that it requires the debtor to adopt
in return for an IMF loan. Jeanne Asherman, The International Monetary Fund: A
History of Compromise, 16 N.Y.U. J. Int'l L. & PoL 235,264-65 (1984). For example,
the IMF may require a limitation on the amount of credit, an increase in taxes, a
decrease in government expenditures, or a devaluation of the currency to increase the
price of imports. Id. at 264. Under a standby arrangement, the borrower receives its
loan in installments and must meet certain "performance conditions" in order to re-
ceive the next phase of the loan. Id. at 265-66.
In the Mexican bailout, Michel Camdessus had agreed to disburse $7.8 billion to
Mexico immediately in one chunk rather than through a typical installment process.
Mexico Rift, supra note 120, at 5. German officials argued that this action under-
mined the IMFs principles of disbursing loans in phases. Id Later, upon reconsidera-
tion, the IMF disbursed the $7.8 billion in two phases. d
168. Rieffel, supra note 167, at 2. The Paris Club was established in 1956. Karen
Hudes, Coordination of Paris and London Club Reschedulings, in International Bor-
rowing: Negotiating and Structuring Loan Transactions 451,451 (Daniel D. Bradiow
ed., 2d ed. 1986). The Paris Club is not an official institution and it does not have a
fixed membership. Rather, it represents a set of renegotiating procedures for the re-
adjustment of debt to official creditors. Rieffel, supra note 167, at 3. The traditional
participants are the 24 member countries of the Organization for Economic Coopera-
tion and Development ("OECD"). Id
169. Hudes, supra note 168, at 451.
170. Rieffel, supra note 167, at 2. The London Club represents a set of renegoti-
ation procedures for the renegotiation of debt owed to commercial creditors. Id. at 3.
In the London Club, the creditors will generally form a steering committee to negoti-
ate with the sovereign debtor. Hudes, supra note 168, at 453. This committee will draft
a model renegotiation agreement with the debtor state. Each individual bank creditor
will then sign their own separate agreement with the sovereign debtor based upon the
model agreement. Id.
171. Hudes, supra note 168, at 452.
172. Id. at 451.
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capital flight that the Mexican economy suffered was a crisis of confi-
dence among individual investors similar to that which occurs among
depositors during a bank run 173 or among creditors of a business dur-
ing a period of financial stress. 74 In both situations, individual depos-
itors and creditors race to be the first either to withdraw their deposits
from a bank or seize assets ahead of other creditors. 175 Thus, when
international investors noticed that Mexico had $29 billion in tesobo-
nos falling due in 1995 with Bank of Mexico reserves at around $6
billion, the creditors panicked.'76 Each individual creditor realized
that if other creditors refused to roll over their bonds, Mexico would
be in default because its reserves were inadequate to meet the de-
mands of all its creditors. 77 Thus, each creditor demanded repay-
ment, pushing Mexico to the brink of default.'17
In the domestic context, Congress established the Federal Re-
serve179 and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation8 0 to prevent
speculative bank runs by assuring depositors in advance of any panic
that aid would be speedily forthcoming to the bank should a panic
occur.'" ' Similarly, to prevent creditors from pushing a government
entity to the brink of default, Congress established Chapter 9 of the
U.S. Bankruptcy Code to immediately impose an automatic stay on
creditor attachment of debtor assets upon petition by the debtor mu-
nicipality.8 2 This forces creditors to give a municipal debtor some
breathing room to readjust its debts and to maximize repayment to
the creditors.18 3
173. Bank runs occur when individual depositors question the liquidity of a bank
during a period of financial stress and withdraw their money in full to protect their
deposit. See Gillian Garcia & Elizabeth Plautz, The Federal Reserve: Lender of Last
Resort 17 (1988). Because most deposit accounts at a bank can be immediately with-
drawn at almost no cost to the depositor and without any substantial penalties, bor-
rowers will race to withdraw their money rather than risk losing their deposit should
the bank become insolvent. Id.
174. Sachs, supra note 2, at 6-7.
175. See id. at 10-11.
176. Id. at 18.
177. Id.
178. See supra note 2.
179. The Federal Reserve was established in 1913 with three major purposes: (1) to
provide money to expand the economy without promoting inflation; (2) to prevent
depositor panics by ensuring depositors that banks would have sufficient liquidity
should a bank panic occur; and (3) to supervise banking procedures. See Garcia &
Plautz, supra note 173, at 36.
180. The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation ("FDIC") was established in 1933
to insure deposits in commercial banks. See Federal Deposit Insurance Corp., FDIC:
Symbol of Confidence 1.
181. See Sachs, supra note 2, at 6. The Federal Reserve has the ability to create
money and is thus the "ultimate liquidity backstop" to break the expectations of a
panic. Garcia & Plautz, supra note 173, at 43.
182. See infra part II.
183. See infra part II.
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These domestic safeguards, however, are sorely lacking in the inter-
national context to assure international investors, before the onset of
a panic, that their credit is protected. The IMF, the Paris Club, and
the London Club do not promise speedy aid in advance of a panic but
rather only after the troubled country agrees to policy reforms."s The
rescheduling often consists of a series of "overexciting and ... last-
minute cliff-hangers" which are only arranged upon an emergency.lns
Thus, a developing nation, without the promise of immediate aid to
honor its short-term obligations, will face a massive exodus of inves-
tors who refuse to roll over old debts and race to withdraw their
money.186 At the same time, however, the developing country lacks
the protections that would accompany a bankruptcy petition under
the United States' Chapter 91 or the benefits of a large scale and
quick injection of liquidity that a domestic lender of last resort, like
the Federal Reserve, would provide.11
Creditor panics are tragically self-fulfilling. Individual creditors and
depositors, fearing the loss of their capital, will effectuate their worst
fears by engaging in a short-sighted panic and destroying a bank, a
corporate enterprise, or even a nation's economy despite the entity's
long-term solvency prospects.189 If the investors had remained calm
and given the debtor some breathing room to readjust its debts, the
investors would have maximized the possiblity for full repayment. 90
The next part will demonstrate that, in the domestic context, Chapter
9191 protects domestic municipalities from creditor panics and maxi-
mizes the repayment to creditors by promoting orderly debt renegoti-
ation between creditors and illiquid municipalities. Chapter 9 can
serve as a model for the establishment of an international bankruptcy
procedure.
I. UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY CODE CHAPTER 9: THE
DOMESTIC MODEL
This part discusses the protections that Chapter 9 provides for mu-
nicipalities against speculative creditor panics. This part argues that
the purposes underlying Chapter 9 apply with equal force in the inter-
184. See supra notes 167-72 and accompanying text.
185. Suratgar, supra note 48, at 494. Furthermore, the amount of money controlled
by bondholders and mutual fund managers dwarfs a typical loan granted by the IMF
and minimizes its ability to maintain investor confidence. See Naim, supra note 24, at
122-23. Consider that while Mexico could normally expect about S2.5 billion in emer-
gency aid from the IMF, Mexico in 1995 owed $30 billion in short-term debt. Id.
186. See U.N. Conf. on Trade and Dev., Trade and Development Report, 1986, at
141, U.N. Doe. UNCTAD/TDR/6, U.N. Sales No. E.86.I1.D.5 (1986).
187. See infra part II.
188. See supra note 179.
189. See supra notes 174-78.
190. See Sachs, supra note 2, at 7.
191. See infra note 196.
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national context to sovereign debtors. It then highlights four Chapter
9 provisions available to municipalities in domestic bankruptcy but
not currently available to sovereign debtors in the international
context.
A. The Purpose of Chapter 9 and its Applicability to Sovereign
Debtors
As the Mexican crisis demonstrated, sovereign debtors are vulnera-
ble to creditor panics during periods of financial stress. Creditors,
fearing a moratorium on debt repayment, race to unload their invest-
ments in the debtor country. Sovereign debtors, suffering a creditor
panic, must find avenues to settle their financial difficulties without
suspending the provision of "essential public services" and thereby
collapsing into "social and financial chaos."' 19
Municipalities in the domestic context face the same issues. Indi-
vidual creditors in the domestic context, spurred by the "first come,
best served" rule,193 also race to withdraw their investments ahead of
other creditors during periods of financial stress. 94 This race, absent
some third-party intercession, will send the municipality into eco-
nomic collapse. If the creditors, as a group, had given the sovereign or
the municipality some breathing room to readjust its debt, this eco-
nomic chaos could have been avoided.195
Chapter 9196 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code 97 protects municipali-
ties from creditor panics and averts economic chaos. 198 Chapter 9
192. David L. Dubrow, Chapter 9 of the Bankruptcy Code: A Viable Option for
Municipalities in Fiscal Crisis?, 24 Urb. Law. 539, 546-47 (1992); see Michael W. Mc-
Connell & Randal C. Picker, When Cities Go Broke: A Conceptual Introduction to
Municipal Bankruptcy, 60 U. Chi. L. Rev. 425, 470 (1993).
193. Garcia & Plautz, supra note 173, at 17.
194. Sachs, supra note 2, at 11.
195. See id. at 13-14.
196. 11 U.S.C. § 901 (1994).
197. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2621 (1978),
amended by Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No.
98-353, 98 Stat. 353 (1984), amended by Bankruptcy Judges, United States Trustees,
and Family Farmer Bankruptcy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-554, 100 Stat. 3089 (1986)
(codified at 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1330 and other scattered sections of the U.S.C., particu-
larly title 28) [hereinafter Bankruptcy Code].
198. See Sachs, supra note 2, at 11. To fie for relief under Chapter 9, a municipality
must meet five requirements: (1) It must be a municipality (defined in 11 U.S.C.
§ 101(40) (1994) as a "political subdivision or public agency or instrumentality of a
State"); (2) the municipality must be authorized to file for relief under Chapter 9 by
"State law, or by a governmental officer or organization empowered by State law to
authorize such entity to be a debtor" under Chapter 9; (3) the municipality must be
insolvent, 11 U.S.C. § 101(32)(C) (1994) (defining the debtor as insolvent when it is
"not paying its debts as they become due unless such debts are the subject of a bona
fide dispute" or is "unable to pay its debts as they become due"); (4) the municipality
wishes to create a plan to adjust its debts; and (5) the municipality either (a) "has
obtained the agreement of creditors holding at least a majority in amount of the
claims of each class that such entity intends to impair under a plan;" (b) "has negoti-
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provides a forum for financially distressed municipalities to renegoti-
ate their debts with their creditors and promotes collective action by
creditors through four specific provisions: (1) the automatic stay;'
(2) the post-petition creditor preference;" (3) the plan of readjust-
ment;2" and (4) the cramdown provision.2°2 These four provisions are
crucial in protecting domestic municipal debtors because they corre-
spond to the four points in debt readjustment when collective action is
most difficult to obtain: (1) at the onset of illiquidity; (2) when new
credit is required; (3) when a plan of readjustment must be formu-
lated; and (4) when a readjustment of the debtor's repayment sched-
ule must be approved by the creditors*203
Chapter 9 also affords a number of procedural protections to pro-
tect the municipality's governmental affairs from impermissible inter-
ference by its creditors. Municipalities are not subject to involuntary
bankruptcy petitions2° and they have the exclusive right to file the
plan of adjustment.20 5 Unlike Chapter 11, under which the court may
appoint a trustee to govern the debtor's affairs,2 6 Chapter 9 protects
the rights of the state to control its political subdivisions20 and the
right of the municipal debtor to manage its internal affairs.2 s This
preserves the municipality's power to govern its own domestic spend-
ing priorities without judicial interference.209
Despite their similar vulnerability to creditor panics and need to
maintain economic stability, sovereign debtors do not enjoy the same
level of protection from creditor panics as municipalities. No interna-
tional agency exists that applies an international version of Chapter 9
and to which a sovereign debtor can turn for protection.21 ° Conse-
quently, as Mexico demonstrated, a sovereign debtor suffering a credi-
ated in good faith with creditors and has failed to obtain the agreement of creditors
holding at least a majority in amount of the claims of each class that such entity in-
tends to impair under a plan;" (c) "is unable to negotiate with creditors because such
negotiation is impracticable;" or (d) "reasonably believes that a creditor may attempt
to obtain a transfer that is avoidable under section 547" of title 11. 11 U.S.C. § 109(c)
(1994).
Should a municipality fail to meet any of these five requirements, a creditor may
object to the filing. 11 U.S.C. § 921(c) (1994).
199. 11 U.S.C. § 901(a) (incorporating 11 U.S.C. § 362 (1994)).
200. Id. § 901(a) (incorporating 11 U.S.C. § 364(c)-(d) (1994)).
201. Id. § 941 (1994).
202. Id. § 901(a) (incorporating 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(1) (1994)).
203. See Sachs, supra note 2, at 11-12.
204. 11 U.S.C. § 901(a) (incorporating 11 U.S.C. § 301 (1994)).
205. Id. § 941 (1994).
206. Id. § 1104(a) (1994).
207. Id. § 903 (1994).
208. Id. § 904 (1994). Thus, if a municipality has properly qualified for relief under
Chapter 9, a bankruptcy court may not interfere with (1)"any of the political or gov-
ernmental powers of the debtor," (2) "any of the property or revenues of the debtor,"
(3) "the debtor's use or enjoyment of any income-producing property." Id.
209. McConnell & Picker, supra note 192, at 462.
210. See supra part I.D.
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tor panic must anxiously wait until an aid package can be arranged by
a developed creditor country, like the United States. Similarly, devel-
oped countries, like the United States, must hope in nervous anticipa-
tion that its aid package is large enough to limit the hemorrhage of
credit from the sovereign debtor.
1. Four Chapter 9 Provisions
This subpart discusses four Chapter 9 provisions that could establish
the basis for an international bankruptcy procedure and that could
provide protection for sovereign debtors similar to that enjoyed by
domestic municipalities. The four provisions are: (1) an automatic
stay; (2) a post-petition creditor preference; (3) a plan of readjust-
ment; and (4) a cramdown procedure.
a. The Automatic Stay
An immediate effect of filing a bankruptcy petition under Chapter 9
is to automatically stay creditors and all other parties in interest from
commencing or continuing lawsuits and enforcing or collecting claims
or judgments against the debtor.211 The stay lasts for thirty days and
then terminates unless the court, after notice and a hearing, renews
the stay.212 The stay has several purposes: to prevent creditors from
harassing the municipal debtor, to promote the orderly administration
of the debtor's assets and avoid their dissipation, and to aid the munic-
ipal debtor in rehabilitating its economic condition by allowing it to
use its assets free from financial pressures.213 Creditors who attempt
to enforce their claims in spite of the stay may be held in contempt of
court.2 1 4
b. Post-Petition Creditor Preference
Although the automatic stay protects the municipal debtor's assets
from its creditors, the municipality may still lack an adequate cash
flow to return to economic health.215 Lenders, however, are under-
standably unwilling to extend credit to an illiquid municipality with-
out priority as to repayment.21 6 To encourage creditors to lend to the
financially distressed municipality, Chapter 9 provides for a post-peti-
tion creditor preference.217 This provision permits a municipality to
obtain unsecured credit by granting the new loan priority of repay-
211. 11 U.S.C. § 901(a) (incorporating 11 U.S.C. § 362 (1994)).
212. Id. § 901(a) (incorporating 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)-(e) (1994)).
213. See Benjamin Weintraub & Alan N. Resnick, Bankruptcy Law Manual 8.10,
at 8-19 (1986).
214. See Harry D. Dixon, Jr. & Joanne L. Manthe, Municipal Adjustments, 1981
Ann. Surv. Bankr. L. 141, 149.
215. See Sachs, supra note 2, at 11.
216. See id.
217. 11 U.S.C. § 901(a) (incorporating 11 U.S.C. § 364(c)-(d) (1994)).
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ment over all administrative expenses, unsecured creditors, and junior
liens already encumbering the property of the debtor. 218 If these in-
centives prove to be ineffective, the court, after notice and a hearing,
may authorize the municipality to issue new debt instruments which
will have repayment priority ahead of all debt incurred prior to the
Chapter 9 petition.219
c. Plan of Adjustment and its Contents
A municipality will generally file a plan of adjustment of its debt
either with the petition or at some later date fixed by the court.2 0
The plan must divide the creditors into separate classes and each class
must consist of substantially similar claims.221 The debtor has broad
discretion in designing a plan of adjustment and may modify the rights
of all creditors relating to repayment of principal, interest, or repay-
ment method.'
The plan of adjustment is a product of the negotiations between the
municipality and creditors to find a mutually acceptable plan for ad-
justing outstanding debt.223 Chapter 9 authorizes the establishment of
a creditor committee to negotiate a readjustment plan with the
debtor.22 This committee's powers include the right to investigate
any issue regarding the debtor pertaining to the negotiation of a plan
and the right to participate in the negotiation and formulation of the
plan.225 Later, the committee will vote on the plan and, if necessary,
object to its confirmation.'
d. Cramdown Provision
The cramdown provision prevents a small minority of creditors who
dispute the reorganization plan from preventing its enactment.227 A
qualified majority of creditors may override the dissent of an im-
paired s class by meeting two requirements. The first requirement is
218. Id. § 901(a) (incorporating 11 U.S.C. § 364(c) (1994)); Dixon & Manthe, supra
note 214, at 149-50. Administrative expenses are expenses such as the costs necessary
to preserve the estate and to pay the wages and salaries of those administering the
bankruptcy proceeding. 11 U.S.C. § 503 (1994). The post-petition preference is gener-
ally interpreted to grant priority over operating expenses of the bankruptcy case.
Dubrow, supra note 192, at 563.
219. 11 U.S.C. § 901(a) (incorporating 11 U.S.C. § 364(d) (1994)).
220. Id § 941 (1994).
221. 11 U.S.C. § 901(a) (incorporating 11 U.S.C. § 1122 (1994)).
222. Ronald D. Greenberg, Municipal Bankruptcy: Some Basic Aspects, 10 Urb.
Law. 266, 278 (1978).
223. Id. at 275.
224. 11 U.S.C. § 901(a) (incorporating 11 U.S.C. § 1102 (1994)).
225. 1d. § 901(a) (incorporating 11 U.S.C. § 1103(c) (1994)).
226. Id. § 901(a) (incorporating 11 U.S.C. § 1126 (a)-(c) (1994)).
227. See Don J. Miner, Comment, Business Reorganization Under the Bankruptcy
Reform Act of 1978: An Analysis of Chapter 11, 1979 B.Y.U. L Rev. 961, 980.
228. A class of claims is not impaired it:
1996] 2675
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
that at least one impaired class must accept the plan.229 A class of
claims has accepted the plan if creditors holding two-thirds in amount
of the claims and consisting of one-half of the number of creditors
approve or are not impaired by the plan.230 The second requirement
is that a court must find that the plan "does not discriminate unfairly,
and is fair and equitable" with respect to the dissenting, impaired
class.2 31 The "unfair discrimination" standard requires that the debtor
treat all classes of equal rank identically under the plan. 32 The "fair
and equitable" doctrine requires that senior creditors receive full com-
pensation before junior creditors receive payment.z3
These four provision are currently unavailable to protect a sover-
eign debtor although it is vulnerable to the same sort of creditor panic
that can send a municipal debtor into an economic collapse. Cogni-
zant of this vacuum in international financial management, the G-7, at
the Halifax summit, floated two proposals as management solutions:
(1) the establishment of an international bankruptcy agency that
would institute an international version of Chapter 9 to extend similar
protections to sovereign debtors and promote orderly debt renegoti-
ation; or (2) the establishment of an EFM, which would serve as a
lender of last resort.2 4 The next part examines both proposals.
III. Two PROPOSALS DISCUSSED: THE INTERNATIONAL
BANKRUPTCY AGENCY AND THE EMERGENCY FINANCING
MECHANISM
This part discusses the two proposals offered at the G-7 summit in
Halifax.235 This part first explores the IBA, how it might function and
apply the four Chapter 9 provisions outlined above to protect sover-
eign debtors. This part then discusses the alternate proposal, the es-
tablishment of an Emergency Financing Mechanism, which would
function as an international lender of last resort.2 36
the plan with respect to each claim in the class (1) cures any prior default,
reinstates the maturity of each claim and does not alter the legal, equita-
ble, or contractual rights of the holder of each claim, or (2) provides for
the payment in cash of the allowed amount of each claim on the effective
date of the plan.
Dubrow, supra note 192, at 577-78.
229. See 11 U.S.C. § 901(a) (incorporating 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(10) (1994)). The
court must also find, inter alia, that the plan has been proposed in good faith. 11
U.S.C. § 901(a) (incorporating 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(3)).
230. 11 U.S.C. § 901(a) (incorporating 11 U.S.C. § 1126(c) (1994)).
231. Id. § 901(a) (incorporating 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(1) (1994)).
232. See Dixon & Manthe, supra note 214, at 157.
233. See 11 U.S.C. § 901(a) (incorporating 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2) (1994)).
234. See infra part III.B.
235. See supra notes 41-50 and accompanying text.
236. See supra notes 41-50 and accompanying text.
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A. The International Bankruptcy Agency and the Establishment of
an International Chapter 9
The International Bankruptcy Agency should be an arbitration fo-
rum to which sovereign debtors would petition for protection from
creditor panics.3 7 Two key advantages to arbitration are that its pro-
ceedings are generally less contentious than court proceedings and
that the parties can establish the procedural rules and regulations that
will govern the management of the dispute.233 This reduces confron-
tation for the debtor state who desires to maintain a good relationship
with investors upon whom it will rely to refinance its existing debt.239
In addition, because the arbitration panel will be deciding sensitive
matters regarding preferences and cramdown which may implicate is-
sues of sovereignty, the parties must perceive that the arbitration pro-
cess is independent of the norms of any one domestic bankruptcy
system.240
The agency's facilities should be available on a voluntary basis. The
IBA would only acquire jurisdiction over a dispute through a proce-
dure for double consent.241 Those who agreed to establish the agency
would not submit themselves to compulsory jurisdiction but would
only signal their willingness to use the agency's renegotiation fo-
rum.242 To obtain jurisdiction over international investors, sovereigns
agreeing to the establishment of the agency would introduce clauses
237. A sovereign cannot realistically be expected to submit to a court-like entity
who can issue binding rulings. See Christopher G. Oechslil Note, Procedural Guide-
lines for Renegotiating LDC Debt An Analogy to Chapter 11 of the U.S. Bankruptcy
Reform Act, 21 Va. J. Int'l L. 305, 333 (1981).
238. Barry E. Carter, The Opportunities and Limits of Legal Remedies in Foreign
Investment Disputes, reprinted in International Law 337, 337 (Barry E. Carter & Phil-
lip R. Trimble eds., 1991).
239. See id
240. For a similar policy in the International Center for the Settlement of Invest-
ment Disputes ("ICSID"), see George R. Delaume, ICSID Arbitration and the
Courts, 77 Am. J. Int'l L. 784,784-85 (1983). In general, many of the procedural rules
in the ICSID are permissive in character and are only enforced as default provisions.
See Ibrahim F. I. Shihata, The Settlement of Disputes Regarding Foreign Investment:
The Role of The World Bank, with Particular Reference to ICSID and MIGA, 1 Am.
U. J. Int'l L. & Polly 97, 104 (1986) [hereinafter Settlement of Disputes].
241. This is the practice currently followed in the ICSID. A country, ratifying the
ICSID convention, only expresses a willingness to use ICSID machinery. Ibrahim F. I.
Shihata, Towards a Greater Depoliticization of Investment Disputes: The Roles of IC-
SID and MIGA, 1986 ICSID Rev.-Foreign Inv. LJ. 1, 4. [hereinafter Greater De-
politicization]. ICSID jurisdiction is only obtained when a member state specifically
consents to the dispute in question. Id. In most cases, an ICSID arbitration clause is
expressly included in an investment agreement or it is included in an investment
treaty or national code. Malcolm D. Rowat, Multilateral Approaches to Improving the
Investment Climate of Developing Countries: The Cases of ICSID and MIGA, 33
Harv. Int'l L.. 103, 109 (1992) [hereinafter Multilateral Approaches].
242. Greater Depoliticization, supra note 241, at 4.
1996] 2677
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
into loan and bond sale agreements providing that, in case of default,
both parties would submit to the jurisdiction of the agency. 43
Once a party has submitted to IBA jurisdiction, the IBA would as-
sure all participants that no party to the agreement may unilaterally
revoke consent.' 4 In addition, consent to IBA arbitration would ex-
clude any other remedy.245 An IBA reorganization plan would bind
the parties without exceptions.246 All parties agreeing to the estab-
lishment of the IBA would pledge to confer upon a reorganization
plan by the IBA the same force as a decision in each parties' own
court.2 4 7
The establishment of the IBA would benefit both sovereign debtors
and creditors. With the addition of a third-party bankruptcy agency
and without new lending to add to the creditors' risk as well as to the
sovereign's debt burden, creditors would be better able to afford to
agree to a reorganization plan with a longer refinancing period for
debtors. 48 Furthermore, in contrast to an expensive bailout similar to
the one provided to Mexico, the costs of operating an international
bankruptcy agency would be relatively low.2 49
The IBA's adoption of international Chapter 9 procedures would
properly respect debtors' sovereignty because the international
agency would not interfere directly in the political and economic af-
fairs of the debtor nation." Chapter 9 recognizes that the "essential
task" of the bankruptcy agency "is to keep the state functioning in an
orderly and necessary manner-in provision of law enforcement, pub-
lic order, a stable currency, basic social protection, and necessary pub-
lic infrastructure-while at the same time eliminating the underlying
economic policies that led to the [economic] disorder."' Thus, adop-
tion of the IBA proposal would leave governance in the hands of
elected political officials and prevent a bankruptcy agency and credi-
tors from interfering in the government's municipal affairs.
The IBA should administer bankruptcy provisions similar to those
found in Chapter 9.22 While a full-blown bankruptcy procedure may
243. See Lessons of the Debt Crisis, supra note 49, at 975; see also Oechsli, supra
note 237, at 333 n.160 (stating that parties in their loan agreements may specify that,
in case of a dispute, an arbitration organization will handle the matter).
244. For the corresponding ICSID practice, see Greater Depoliticization, supra note
241, at 7.
245. Id. at 8 (discussing the parallel procedures followed in the ICSID).
246. Id.
247. Similarly, no exception exists to the binding character of an ICSID award. Id.
at 8. The ICSID award has the effect of a final judgment in the courts of the member
states. Id. at 9.
248. See A Middle Way, supra note 48, at 34.
249. Id.
250. See supra notes 204-09 and accompanying text.
251. Sachs, supra note 2, at 14.
252. See supra notes 198-202.
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be unrealistic given the differences in national bankruptcy codes,2 3 an
international bankruptcy agency that administered a limited interna-
tional Chapter 9 procedure would be more feasible.- s'
1. The Automatic Stay
A nation suffering a speculative creditor panic would be authorized
to file a bankruptcy petition, after which the IBA would issue an auto-
matic stay.255 The agency, upon granting this stay, would allow credi-
tors to object to the filing of the petition on some of the same grounds
afforded by Chapter 9.256 For example, the creditors may object that
the debtor did not make a bona fide attempt to negotiate with credi-
tors prior to filing.' Alternatively, the creditors may object that the
253. See Barry Eichengreen & Richard Portes, Crisis? What Crisis? Orderly Work-
outs for Sovereign Debtors 42 (1995) [hereinafter What Crisis?]. For example, the
U.S. Bankruptcy Code treats a debtor more favorably than the bankruptcy laws in the
United Kingdom or Germany. Id. at 14. Unlike the United States, the United King-
dom requires the debtor to obtain the approval of creditors prior to the approval of
administrative priority for post-petition loans. Id at 11. Eichengreen and Portes do,
however, endorse a limited international bankruptcy procedure which would include
a temporary stay and a craindown provision. lId at 18.
254. In pushing for the establishment of international bankruptcy procedures, Pro-
fessor Sachs presents the ludicrously divergent treatment accorded to the R.H. Macy
Corp. and Russia when both experienced financial difficulties. Sachs, supra note 2, at
20-21. When Macy's filed for Chapter 11 protection in the United States, it immedi-
ately received an automatic stay and three weeks later obtained $600 million in post-
petition financing. Id. Professor Sachs contrasts this approach with the treatment
Russia received when it notified its G-7 creditors that it would be unable to continue
to service its debt. Unlike Macy's, Russia neither received an automatic stay nor
quickly received new financing from private creditors or the IMF. Sachs, supra note 2,
at 20-21. Rather, the international community allowed individual creditors and for-
eign governments to harass Russia with legal challenges and intense foreign political
pressure. Id. at 21; see also Jeffrey Sachs, The Reformers' Tragedy, N.Y. Times, Jan.
23, 1994, at E17 (discussing the failings of the IMF and world leaders in dealing with
the Russian debt crisis). For an article supporting Professor Sachs' viewpoint, see
Leonard M. Salter, Can the Soviet Union Use a Chapter 11? Would It Be Effective?, 96
Com. L.. 90 (1994).
The United Kingdom and Germany oppose the creation of a bankruptcy agency.
The establishment of this agency under IMF auspices would empower the IMF to set
aside contracts and to compel creditors to accept the approval of readjustment agree-
ments. See Davis, supra note 40, at A4. The United Kingdom and Germany believe
that such ideas are "too grandiose and favour[ ] more modest measures, particularly
increased surveillance of key economies to pre-empt financial shocks." Mark Tran,
UK to Oppose International Bankruptcy Court Proposal, Guardian, June 14, 1995, at
12. Furthermore, Germany argued that Chapter 9 or Chapter 11 protection for a
debtor country would induce a moral hazard by encouraging bad financial policies.
See Davis, supra note 40, at A4.
255. An quasi-automatic stay already exists in international debtor/creditor rela-
tions-a country may unilaterally impose a moratorium on debt repayment. Hurlock,
supra note 48, at 11. Countries, with assets at risk of attachment in foreign countries,
have generally refrained from this act of default. Id. Moreover, sovereign debtors
have sought to maintain continued creditworthiness. See infra notes 357-58 and ac-
companying text.
256. See supra note 198.
257. See supra note 198.
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debtor did not file to adjust its debts in good faith but rather was
fraudulently using the international Chapter 9 provision as a vehicle
to avoid repayment of its debt." 8 Because creditors have recourse to
these safeguards, a debtor would be less likely to use the threat of a
bankruptcy petition as leverage against its creditors.
2. Post-Petition Creditor Preference
With the post-petition creditor preference, a nation in financial dis-
tress can give new creditors preference for their loans, assuring them
of timely repayment and thus enhancing the possibility that the debtor
will receive new credit.260 The commercial banks' reluctance to lend
to Mexico following the devaluation demonstrates the need for this
preference.261 Commercial bankers in 1995 were unwilling to extend
fresh loans to Mexico because they were skeptical that the bailout
would revitalize Mexico. They feared that the conditions imposed on
Mexico would instead create a deep recession.262 Accordingly, the
$50 billion rescue plan included only $3 billion from private sector
commercial banks.263 The United States had originally hoped that
large banks such as Citibank and J.P. Morgan would have been heavy
contributors to the bailout package.2 4 Commercial banks, however,
after being burned in Latin America during the 1980s, were unwilling
to return without repayment priority.265
258. See supra note 229.
259. This automatic stay would not have the destabilizing effects it would have had
in the 1980s. For a discussion of the 1982 debt crisis, see supra note 21. At that time,
the creditors consisted primarily of the largest international money center banks who
were so overextended in their loans that they had to ensure the receipt of interest
payments by the debtor countries to avoid writing off the debts as unrepayable and
consequently suffering enormous losses. Maclflan, supra note 108, at 321. Loans to
Mexico and Brazil accounted for 90.3% of the total bank capital of the nine largest
U.S. banks. Mexico Financial Crisis, supra note 21, at CRS-4. Under United States
regulatory and accounting rules, banks would have had to declare all of these loans as
non-performing if interest payments been suspended for more than 90 days after their
due dates. MacMillan, supra note 108, at 321. An automatic stay may have
threatened the financial stability of commercial banks and destabilized the entire in-
ternational financial system. IL Today, because the debt is widely dispersed among
thousands of bondholders, see supra notes 143-44 and accompanying text, an auto-
matic stay would not have the same destabilizing impact.
260. See supra notes 215-19 and accompanying text.
261. After the 1995 crisis, investment barely trickled back into Latin America. See
David E. Sanger & Anthony DePalma, U.S. Bailout of Mexico Verging on Success or
Dramatic Failure, N.Y. Times, Apr. 2, 1995, at Al [hereinafter Dramatic Failure] (stat-
ing that rather than a trickle, the United States needed a "river" of investment if the
bailout was to succeed).
262. International Bankruptcy Code, supra note 48, at *4.
263. See supra text accompanying note 118.
264. See Hard Year, supra note 112, at *4.
265. See Cline, supra note 67, at 426-27.
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A clear preference for post-petition loans and a hierarchy of prefer-
ences among post-petition loans2" would also be useful in averting a
repetition of the dispute which arose between the Europeans and
Americans following the bailout. Still smarting from the United
States' failure to consult with them in arranging the bailout, officials at
the BIS insisted that their loans have some repayment priority over
the United States' own $20 billion.2 7 The BIS officials felt that be-
cause they were pressured to extend loans for an essentially American
problem,2" the United States' funds should be the first in and the last
out.26 9 This repayment preference, however, was never accepted by
the United States. 7 0
3. Plan of Readjustment
Upon the grant of an automatic stay, the petitioning nation would
have the exclusive right to file a plan of adjustment under the interna-
tional Chapter 9.271 While the bondholders would not have a right to
file a plan, they would have the right as creditors to vote on a plan and
object to the confirmation of the plan. 72 Mexico, given the chance,
may have filed a plan under which it would have rescheduled its
quickly maturing tesobonos debt, staggering its repayment and offer-
ing more attractive interest rates for a longer maturity period.' r Al-
ternatively, rather than rescheduling, Mexico may have tried to repay
the bonds by raising new money through private lenders, offering its
oil revenues as collateral.274
In formulating a plan of repayment and preferences, the petitioning
nation could draw upon various historical methods of classifying its
creditors. In the past, repayment preferences have been attached to
bonds issued for the economic and financial rehabilitation of the
country.2 75 Similarly, repayment preferences have been given to loans
that were incurred under a newly formulated readjustment plan and
intended to assist an insolvent debtor to repay previous loans. 27 6 In
266. See infra notes 275-77 and accompanying text.
267. See Mexico Rift, supra note 120, at 5.
268. See Graham et al., supra note 1, at 4.
269. See Mexico Rift, supra note 120, at 5.
270. See id.
271. See supra notes 220-26 and accompanying text.
272. See supra note 226 and accompanying text.
273. See Ackerman & Dorn, supra note 133, at 21.
274. See Sachs, supra note 2, at 18.
275. See Edwin Borchard, State Insolvency and Foreign Bondholders 341 (1951).
For example, Greece in 1898, granted a preference for a floating gold debt because
these loans allowed the banks of Greece to resume regular financial transactions. Id.
at 342.
276. Id at 342 & n.15 (Greece, in 1898, and Mexico, in 1930, gave preferences for
loans that were issued to discharge obligations under a debt readjustment plan).
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other cases, repayment priority has been given to loans based simply
on the chronological order in which the loans were received. 77
To comment on the plan, foreign tesobonos bondholders could or-
ganize themselves into a committee.278 Unlike the 1980s, where a tri-
partite decision-making structure, involving the sovereign debtor, the
IMF, and commercial banks, renegotiated loans, the current bank-
ruptcy negotiation will involve bilateral negotiations between the sov-
ereign debtor and the committee of bondholders. 279  Hopefully,
national governments including the United States will encourage their
citizens to organize bondholders' protective committees similar to
those that emerged during the debt crisis in the early twentieth cen-
tury. 80 These committees would have the power to investigate all
matters regarding the debtor relevant to the formulation of a plan, to
participate in negotiations and discussions with the debtor, and to per-
form any other services in the interests of the creditors represented by
the committee.281
The IBA would have the authority to evaluate formally the debtor's
economic situation in order to objectively ascertain its economic cir-
cumstances2m After this evaluation, the IBA would determine
whether the plan proposed by the debtor nation was formulated in
good faith, whether the plan was in the best interest of creditors, and
was feasible." 3 The agency, upon approving the plan, would issue a
binding plan of readjustment similar to that achieved under Chapter
9.84 The agency then would have the power to monitor the debtor's
faithful compliance with the plan.285
277. Id. at 344.
278. See MacMillan, supra note 108, at 337.
279. Id. at 344.
280. See id. at 337-38. After the stock market crash in the United States in 1929,
the ensuing worldwide depression caused defaults throughout Europe and Latin
America. Borchard, supra note 275, at 193. The State Department, in the wake of this
crisis, established the Foreign Bondholders' Protective Committee, an autonomous
committee which was incorporated on December 13, 1933 to negotiate with sovereign
debtors. Id. at 193-196. The State Department wanted to avoid entangling itself in
the readjustment negotiations while also lending some governmental support to the
efforts of the bondholders' committee. See id. at 193. The bondholders committee's
power was derived from its semi-official status. Id. at 198. While the committee did
not have binding authority to make decisions for the bondholders, its recommenda-
tions carried considerable weight. Id.
For an overall discussion of the 1930s bond defaults, see Barry Eichengreen &
Richard Portes, Debt and Default in the 1930s, 30 Eur. Econ. Rev. 599 (1986).
281. See supra note 225 and accompanying text.
282. A Middle Way, supra note 48, at 33.
283. See supra note 229 and accompanying text.
284. See Brett H. Miller, Note, Sovereign Bankruptcy: Examining the United States
Bankruptcy System as a Forum for Sovereign Debtors, 22 Law & Pol'y Int'l Bus. 107,
126-27 (1991).
285. See A Middle Way, supra note 48, at 34.
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4. Cramdown
In a readjustment process, the IBA may lengthen the financing of
the principal and interest over a longer maturity or may write down
debts to match the debtor's economic capacity to repay.28 Because
each creditor has an incentive to wait and see if the other creditors
make concessions while holding out for a full repayment of its own
claim, a cramdown provision is necessary to prevent a "free rider"
problem.' The cramdown power forces dissenting creditors to ac-
cept terms agreed upon by a qualified majority of creditors.'
The IBA, to enforce the cramdown, could rely upon the IMF's Sec-
tion 2(b) powers. m Section 2(b) creates extraterritorial recognition
of foreign exchange controls in IMF member states.290 The IMF's Ar-
ticles of Agreement VIII (2)(b) provides that "exchange contracts"'29
involving an IMF member that are contrary to an IMF sanctioned ex-
change control regulations29 are unenforceable. This provision is
binding upon all members of the IMF and their respective judicial and
administrative authorities. 94 The IMF could plausibly sanction the
286. Sachs, supra note 2, at 11.
287. See id.; A Middle Way, supra note 48, at 33.
288. See supra notes 227-33 and accompanying text.
289. Sachs, supra note 2, at 19; see Christopher Greenwood & Hugh Mercer, Con-
siderations of International Law, in What Crisis?, supra note 253, at 105, 111.
Section 2(b) of Article VIII of the IMF Agreement provides:
Exchange contracts which involve the currency of any member and which
are contrary to the exchange control regulations of that member main-
tained or imposed consistently with this Agreement shall be unenforce-
able in the territories of any member. In addition, members may, by
mutual accord, co-operate in measures for the purpose of making the ex-
change control regulations of either member more effective, provided that
such measures and regulations are consistent with this Agreement.
Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund, December 27, 1945, art.
VIII § 2(b), 66 Stat. 1401, 2 U.N.T.S. 39 (1944) [hereinafter Articles of Agreement].
290. Gerhard Wegen, 2(b) or Not 2(b): Fity Years of Questions-The Practical
Implications of Article VIII Section 2(b), 62 Fordham L Rev. 1931, 1933-34 (1994).
291. Conflicting interpretations exist as to which financial obligations constitute an
"exchange contract." Id. at 1937. The United States and the United Kingdom define
"exchange contract" in the narrowest sense, interpreting it only to cover a contract
whose subject is the exchange of currency. Id. This interpretation would include bond
purchases that involve international payments and transfers. See Edwards, supra note
8, at 485.
In contrast, continental legal systems interpret "exchange contract" to apply to the
sale of goods and services that would impact a nation's level of foreign reserves.
Wegen, supra note 290, at 1938. Under this broad interpretation, virtually any con-
tract would be an "exchange contract," including a bond purchase because of its po-
tential impact on a nation's foreign reserves. Id.
292. Judicial decisions generally interpret "exchange control regulations" to include
"all regulations that take the form of direct controls on international payments or
transfers." Edwards, supra note 8, at 480.
293. For example, had Mexico imposed IMF-approved exchange controls after the
onset of the capital flight, international bondholders could not attempt to enforce
their claims in the courts of IMF member states.
294. Id. at 478.
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cramdown as a valid "exchange control regulation" and bonds issued
to investors could be classified as "exchange contracts. 2 95 Under this
intepretation of Section 2(b), creditors could not challenge a
cramdown by attempting to redeem their maturing bonds or attaching
the debtor's assets in the national courts of their respective states.296
B. The Emergency Financing Mechanism Proposal
As an alternative to the IBA, world leaders, at the Halifax summit,
offered a second proposal, the establishment of an Emergency Financ-
ing Mechanism.2 97 The G-10298 members of the General Arrange-
ments to Borrow299 envision the EFM as a set of specific procedures
to provide "quick, front-loaded financing [to debtor nations] with
strong safeguards" for repayment.00 The EFM will be financed by
doubling the resources of the GAB, which currently stand at about
$27 billion,31 with separate lines of credit from non-GAB member
countries who have current account surpluses. 0 2 Thus, the establish-
ment of the EFM rescue procedures will not alter the existing mem-
bership of the GAB 303 and the EFM's policies will be modelled
largely after those of the GAB.3 1 This subpart discusses the GAB,
and then discuss specifically how the EFM would function as an inter-
national lender of last resort.
1. The General Arrangements to Borrow
The GAB is an arrangement of credit lines established by the G-10
in 1962.305 The GAB was established in response to erratic short-term
capital flows which were disrupting overall liquidity positions and
rates. 30 6 To assist countries suffering short-term capital outflows, the
295. See supra notes 7-10 and accompanying text.
296. See Hurlock, supra note 48, at 12; Sachs, supra note 2, at 19.
297. See supra notes 42-47 and accompanying text.
298. The Group of Ten are the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada,
France, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Belgium, Federal Republic of Germany, and Swe-
den. Edwards, supra note 8, at 288. Later, the Swiss National Bank was added as an
authorized lender. Id.
299. See infra notes 305-19 and accompanying text.
300. Diana I. Gregg, Camdessus Hopeful on Doubling of Fund Resources to Deal
with Emergencies, BNA's Daily Rep. for Executives, Oct. 6, 1995, at A194 [hereinaf-
ter Camdessus Hopeful].
301. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
302. Camdessus Hopeful, supra note 300, at A194. At this point, it is still unclear
which members of the international community will supply the additional funding. See
infra note 366 and accompanying text.
303. See Camdessus Hopeful, supra note 300, at A194.
304. U.S. and International Response to the Mexican Financial Crisis: Hearings
Before the House Comm. on Banking and Financial Services, 104th Cong., 1st Sess.
427,432-433 (1995) (statement of C. Fred Bergsten, Director of the Institute for Inter-
national Economics) [hereinafter Bergsten Statement].
305. See Michael Ainley, The General Arrangements to Borrow 1 (1984).
306. Id. at 2.
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IMF borrows from the GAB as a supplemental resource when the
funds in the General Resources Account307 are inadequate. °  GAB
resources were originally for the exclusive use of the ten members of
the GAB 3°9 and were intended to deter speculation by displaying to
the markets that the JMF has adequate resources to keep currencies
stable.31 0 The IMF may borrow from GAB members who are exper-
iencing capital inflows to assist other GAB members who are suffering
capital outflows.31 ' The GAB, however, does not automatically dis-
burse funds to needy members, nor does it promise to lend money in
advance of agreed upon policy reforms.312 In fact, the GAB requires
a five-step process before activating its resources. First, an IMF mem-
ber-nation must consult with the Managing Director of the IMF313 to
determine whether GAB intervention is necessary. 1 4 Second, the
Managing Director consults with the other contributors to the GAB
and the Executive Directors of the IMF.315 The Managing Director
will then issue a proposal for calls to inquire into the amount of
money each GAB contributor is willing to lend to the requesting
country.316 The proposal must then be unanimously approved by the
participants in the GAB,3 17 after which the IMF's Executive Board
must approve the arrangement as the fifth and final step in the ap-
proval process. 318 After reaching an arrangement, the IMF will ad-
minister a standby arrangement for the disbursement of the loan.3 19
2. The EFM's Function as Lender of Last Resort
Proponents envision the EFM as a set of procedures to be estab-
lished within the existing GAB to provide quick and temporary aid to
307. See supra note 123.
308. Edwards, supra note 8, at 287-88.
309. Id. at 288. After 1983, IMF members who did not contribute to the GAB were
allowed to borrow from the GAB, but they were required to meet stricter conditions.
Halifax, supra note 24, at CRS-4.
310. Ainley, supra note 305, at 11.
311. Id. at 11. The IMF, when it borrows from the GAB, promises to pay interest
and to make repayments within five years to the participant lenders. Edwards, supra
note 8, at 290.
312. Bergsten Statement, supra note 304, at 433.
313. The Managing Director of the IMF is the chairperson of the Executive Board
and is selected by the Executive Board. Edwards, supra note 8, at 30. The Managing
Director heads and directs the staff of the IMF. Id.
314. Ainley, supra note 305, at 15.
315. Id.
316. Id. The Managing Director usually requests from a GAB member an amount
in proportion to its contribution. Id. at 17.
317. Id. at 15. If unanimous approval by the participants cannot be reached, a bind-
ing weighted vote will be taken. Id.
318. Id. at 15-16. The Executive Board is responsible for the general operations of
the IMF. Edwards, supra note 8, at 28. It consists of 22 Directors and is chaired by
the Managing Director. Id at 29. Although 5 Directors are appointed by the 5 coun-
tries who contribute the largest quotas, the other 16 are elected for two year terms. Id.
319. See Edwards, supra note 8, at 289; see supra note 167.
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countries suffering from a speculative creditor panic. The EFM will
function as an international lender of last resort ("LLR") analogous
to the Federal Reserve in the domestic context.32° In the domestic
context, an LLR's function is to protect solvent banks suffering a spec-
ulative panic among their depositors. 32 1 Bank runs, absent a lender of
last resort, are a constant threat because depositor confidence is frag-
ile.322 Depositor perceptions are susceptible to misinformation and
inaccurate judgments about the quality of the bank's loans because
accurate data is difficult or impossible to obtain.32 3 Consequently,
high-strung creditors may "run" on any sign of financial downturn,
leading to contagion and a possible systemic financial crisis.324
An effective LLR, to prevent such a panic, must possess certain
characteristics. First, unlike other lenders who might demand assur-
ances of repayment prior to a loan, an LLR needs no such assurance
because it will have better information than private-market depositors
about the soundness of a financial institution. An LLR will be com-
mitted to act immediately and prior to the negotiation of a repayment
plan.3 25 Furthermore, the LLR must have the resources to manage
the largest potential crisis in order to properly to maintain investor
confidence during periods of financial stress. 326 Finally, an LLR must
be able to prevent the moral hazard that might result from its
presence.327
The Mexican crisis demonstrated that the international securities
market is susceptible to crises similar to domestic bank runs, exposing
the need for an international LLR analogous to a domestic LLR. In
Mexico, for example, because international investors faced imperfect
information about Mexico's long-term solvency, they refused to roll
over their credit.3 8 Mexico, like a domestic bank, was also heavily
indebted on short-term loans and thus was subject to the intemper-
ances of the fragile confidence of its investors. 329 Finally, because of
320. See Sachs, supra note 2, at 18.
321. See Jack Guttentag and Richard Herring, The Lender-of-Last-Resort Function
in an International Context 4 (Essays in Int'l Fin. No. 151, 1983).
322. Id. at 6.
323. Id.
324. Id.
325. Id. at 5-6. "Central to the LLR function is a willingness to accept a risk unac-
ceptable to other lenders." Id. at 4.
326. Id. at 10.
327. Id. Two types of moral hazard can result from the presence of an LLR: (1) an
LLR may reduce the risk of engaging in highly speculative investments and therefore
may encourage such activity and; (2) an LLR may encourage those who are near
insolvency to "go-for-broke" in order to obtain LLR assistance. Id.
328. Mexico's crisis was one of short-term illiquidity, as opposed to long-term insol-
vency, although investors raced to withdraw their money. See supra notes 101-04 and
accompanying text.
329. See supra notes 159-64 and accompanying text. In the international financial
system, confidence among investors is even more fragile than in the domestic context.
Guttentag & Herring, supra note 321, at 2. Perceived risk among international inves-
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the globalization of the securities markets, the risks of contagion and a
systemic crisis emanating from Mexico were great.33
In sum, the establishment of the EFM would ostensibly provide in-
ternational safeguards similar to those provided by a domestic LLR.
The EFM as a lender of last resort would serve to assure investors, in
advance of a speculative investor panic, that their investments enjoy
protection and that speedy, short-term relief is available should a
panic occur. Proponents of the EFM argue that it would deter the
onset of a crisis mentality by displaying to the markets in advance of a
panic that it is authorized to lend a large sum of money to a temporar-
ily illiquid nation in the event a panic materializes. The next part
demonstrates, however, that the EFM will fail as an effective LLR.
IV. Two PROPOSALS COMPARED: THE LBA is THE MORE
EFFECTIVE SOLUTION TO MANAGE "POST-MODERN"
SOVEREIGN DEBT CRISES
This part compares the EFM proposal wvith the IBA proposal in
light of three factors and argue that the IBA proposal is preferable.
This part also argues that the IMF is the proper organization to estab-
lish the IBA. Because the IMF is an inherently political organization,
however, the IMF, following the World Bank's establishment of the
International Center for the Settlement of Investment Disputes ("IC-
SID") and the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency ("MIGA"),
should organize the IBA as a separate and independent affiliate.
A. Three Primary Considerations
The international community, following the Mexican crisis, recog-
nized the urgent need to establish procedures to manage the next
"post-modern" crisis. Three considerations are critical in deciding the
type of mechanism to establish: (1) whether the mechanism can act
quickly and decisively; (2) whether the mechanism can prevent a
moral hazard; and (3) whether the mechanism can respond to multiple
and simultaneous crises. The following discussion will demonstrate
that the IBA is better able to satisfy these three criteria.
1. The Speed With Which the Mechanism Can Respond to
Speculative Creditor Panics
The EFM, operating under policies similar to those that govern the
GAB, will not promise to lend money to a debt-ridden country in ad-
tors is heightened due to the constant threat of state-imposed exchange controls, the
decreased availability of information, and the susceptibility of international econom-
ics to political shifts. Id
330. See supra notes 152-56 and accompanying text.
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vance of a crisis. 331 Rather, following traditional GAB policies, the
EFM will demand policy reforms prior to the approval of a rescue
loan to ensure prompt repayment.332 This prerequisite, however, un-
dermines an essential function of an LLR: its willingness to provide
emergency funding in advance of policy reforms to maintain creditor
confidence.333 Traditional requirements of consultation and negotia-
tion were feasible in the 1980s when the primary lenders were com-
mercial banks who were restrained by sharing clauses 334 and a
collective sense of doom should any of them act individually.335 Lend-
ing in the 1990s, however, comes primarily from thousands of individ-
ual bondholders.336 There is, therefore, a greater risk of panic in the
1990s because the bondholders are not similarly restrained and thus
less prone to act collectively. The EFM, contrary to its stated policy,
must be "willing[ ] to accept a risk unacceptable to other lenders" and
it must guarantee the prompt award of aid prior to securing policy
reforms.337 Otherwise, the result of any EFM loan will be "too little,
too late. ' 338 By the time the EFM loan arrives, the debtor govern-
ment will be under an onslaught from its creditors.
A bankruptcy forum, because it is not a lender but a regulator,
would be able to act quickly and decisively.339 Unlike the EFM, which
is directly lending taxpayer dollars and must be circumspect in its
lending, the IBA is simply facilitating the receipt of new loans by the
debtor country from post-petition creditors.3 n Thus, while EFM poli-
cies intrinsically resist quick action, the IBA may immediately impose
an automatic stay upon the filing of a bankruptcy petition to impose
collectivity on the creditors and forestall a race to grab available as-
sets.34' It can thus quarantine a debtor state from its creditors while
331. See Camdessus Hopeful, supra note 300, at A194 ("We will never say in ad-
vance, never be committed to rescue a country because it is a country.... We will
only do that... in proportion of the effort of the country to put its house in order.");
George Graham, IMF Crisis Plan Draws on Mexican Lesson, Fm. Times, Oct. 2, 1995,
at 6 ("Even with new procedures ... smooth consultation [in the EFM] may be diffi-
cult when, as in the Mexican crisis, a decision is needed overnight.") [hereinafter IMF
Crisis Plan]; see supra part III.B.
332. See supra notes 312-19 and accompanying text.
333. See supra note 325 and accompanying text.
334. A sharing clause is a provision introduced into a syndicated bank loan to pre-
vent a single rogue bank from recovering a disproportionate share of repayment after
a debtor defaults. Lee C. Buchheit & Ralph Reisner, The Effect of the Sovereign Debt
Restructuring Process on Inter-Creditor Relationships, 1988 U. Ill. L. Rev. 493, 502.
For a general discussion about maintaining the commitment of sovereign lenders
through syndicates, see Asiedu-Akrofi, supra note 137, at 1.
335. See infra notes 382-84 and accompanying text.
336. Cline, supra note 67, at 481.
337. See Guttentag & Herring, supra note 321, at 4.
338. See Sachs, supra note 2, at 21.
339. See id.
340. Id.; see supra notes 260-70 and accompanying text.
341. See supra notes 255-59 and accompanying text.
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collective, disinterested analysis establishes the true situation and de-
vises the best course of action.'
2. The Prevention of Moral Hazard
The EFM creates a moral hazard because it distorts the view among
both governments and investors that portfolio investment is a venture
that they enter into at their own risk? 3 Under the EFM proposal,
national governments will marshall public taxpayer money to soften
the misfortune visited upon risk-taking portfolio investors?3" Future
investors, relying on a forecasted EFM bailout, will engage in risky
investing because their losses ultimately will be borne by creditor gov-
ernments and multilateral financial institutions." s With the availabil-
ity of the EFM, moreover, investors will downgrade the potential risks
of an emerging market. A two-tier market will result where investors
will classify emerging economies either as one the EFM is likely to aid
or one that the EFM is likely to ignore 46 A country like Mexico,
confident that the health of its economy was vital to the global econ-
342. Suratgar, supra note 48, at 497.
343. Greenspan Testimony, supra note 24, at 8; see Minton-Beddoes, supra note
105, at 130-31; Ackerman & Dorn, supra note 133, at 21; Halifax, supra note 24, at
CRS-5.
Minton-Beddoes also launches another criticism of an international LLR. She
states that an international LLR, in disbursing a loan, assumes that it understands a
country's economic fundamentals better than the market. See Mimton-Beddoes, supra
note 105, at 131. Further, authorizing an international LLR to lend enormous sums of
money to countries suffering an "'unjustified' speculative attack" is impractical due
to the absence of any objective measure to determine how much money is necessary
to prevent the panic. Id. For a viewpoint that argues that no valid reason supports
LLR lending and that it always generates a moral hazard, see Roland Vaubel, The
Moral Hazard of IMF Lending, World Economy, Sept. 1983, at 291.
344. Ip, supra note 127, at 10. This undercuts the IMF's widely praised practice
during the 1982 debt crisis of pressuring commercial banks to issue involuntary loans
as a condition for new IMF money. See MacMillan, supra note 108, at 318. The IMF
forced banks to issue these loans because it was more appropriate for private credi-
tors and borrowers to participate actively in their own debt renegotiation than for the
IMF to act as a lender of last resort. Ia The involuntary loans extracted from the
banks were the price they paid for their poor lending judgment. See id. at 318-19. If
the IMF had shouldered the burden of lending money alone without additional bank
aid, the IMF would have undertaken the responsibility of debt repayment to the
banks, relieving the debtor of its responsibility and rewarding the irresponsibility of
commercial banks. See Ip, supra note 127, at 10.
This, however, is what essentially occurred in Mexico. Investors who had assumed
certain risks to profit handsomely from their tesobonos investments were subse-
quently given a windfall by the bailout, which effectively negated the risks the inves-
tors had originally undertaken. See Robert M. Dunn Jr., $40 Billion for Wall Street...,
Wash. Post, Jan. 24, 1995, at A17. Money from the Mexican bailout was used to repay
wealthy investors and did little to help Mexican citizens. Whalen Statement, supra
note 112, at 270. The investors who were paid back simply "swept up" their profits
and left the country. Dramatic Failure, supra note 261, at Al.
345. Naim, supra note 24, at 128; see Ip, supra note 127, at 10.
346. See Ackerman & Dom, supra note 133, at 21.
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omy, would treat the EFM as "no fault" insurance for its economic
mishaps. 47
The EFM, to prevent a moral hazard, has proposed a number of
tactics. In addition to maintaining strictly the ad hoc nature of its
loans and refusing to promise aid in advance of agreed upon policy
reforms,' the EFM will have two requirements. First, there must be
an actual risk of contagion to result foreseeably from a debtor state's
economic demise. 4 9 Second, the EFM will impose severe conditions
on a recipient nation's economic policies in return for a loan.350
These policies are of questionable value in eliminating a moral haz-
ard. The EFM's ad hoc policy is antithetical to the primary purpose of
an LLR.351 An effective LLR must promise money in advance of
agreed upon policy reforms in order to prevent possible confidence
crises.3 52 If investors must speculate about the provision of aid to a
country in economic crisis, then the LLR has abdicated its primary
function. Furthermore, imposing strict conditions to prevent moral
hazard is counterproductive. Following the bailout, the austere condi-
tions imposed on Mexico were predicted to send Mexico into a reces-
sion.35 3 Because of the stringency of the conditions imposed on
Mexico, investors feared that the "draconian" terms would produce
not just a "cleansing recession, but a revolutionary despair. 35 4
The availability of an international Chapter 9 is preferable to the
EFM because it will not create a moral hazard.355 A readjustment
347. See Vaubel, supra note 343, at 293. Notably, a similar moral hazard problem
exists with the EFM's domestic counterpart, the Federal Reserve. See Garcia &
Plautz, supra note 173, at 167-68. Lender of last resort lending by the Federal Re-
serve interferes with market forces which reward the productive and punish the un-
productive. Thus, the "financial safety net.., has removed many of the anti-risk
incentives at depository institutions." Id. at 167. For a more in-depth discussion of
this issue, see Edward J. Kane, Appearance and Reality in Deposit Insurance: The
Case for Reform, 10 J. Banking & Fin. 175 (1986).
348. See supra note 331 and accompanying text.
349. Ip, supra note 127, at 10.
350. Id. As a condition of the 1995 bailout, the Mexicans agreed to produce a
budget surplus, reduce credit growth, and provide frequent and detailed reports of its
economic and financial status. Id. at 10. Mexico agreed to raise gasoline prices by
35% and electricity by 20%. Anthony DePalma, Mexico Initiates an Economic Plan
of Extended Pain, N.Y. Times, Mar. 10, 1995, at Al. Mexico's value added tax will
increase to 15%. Id. The United States has also demanded that Mexico raise it inter-
est rates to 60%. International Bankruptcy Code, supra note 48, at *4.
351. See supra note 325 and accompanying text.
352. Id.
353. International Bankruptcy Code, supra note 48, at *4.
354. Id. This fear is justified given that IMF conditions historically have been criti-
cized for curing the ill patient by sending him into a coma. See Cheryl Payer, The
Debt Trap: The International Monetary Fund and the Third World 47 (1974).
355. Hurlock, supra note 48, at 10 ("Experience has proved wrong those who
feared that a bankruptcy debt discharge would tempt debtors into profligacy."); Na-
der Testimony, supra note 107, at 72 (arguing that rather than a bailout fund that sets
terrible precedents and moral hazards, an organization should serve as a "referee" for
a settlement between debtors and creditors where both make sacrifices).
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under the international Chapter 9 will not provide an avenue for a
debtor nation to procrastinate on fundamental economic reforms. 6
Rather, the IBA, employing both internal and external pressures, can
expedite the same deep economic reforms that the EFM intends to
foster by its imposition of economic conditions in return for a bailout.
Internally, sovereign debtors will undertake voluntary economic re-
forms to keep creditors "sweet" and to attract new lending to service
their debts.357 Debtors, by their past cooperativeness, have displayed
a genuine ambition to maintain continuing creditworthiness. 318 Exter-
nally, the IBA acts as a third party in readjustment negotiations to
judge not only the adequacy of the debtor's plan but also to monitor
the debtor's behavior under the plan to ensure compliance. 359 The
body of precedent the IBA will eventually establish will set expecta-
tions to determine which petitions will be accepted, what procedures
will be used, and the extent of debt readjustment that the debtor can
expect.360
3. The Ability to Handle Multiple Liquidity Crises Simultaneously
The Mexican bailout was enormous, totalling about one-half the
value of Mexico's external debt in 1982.31 The United States in-
tended to send a message to the international financial community
that Mexico had the backing of the United States and the IMF and
was worthy of continuing confidence.362 If, however, another Latin
American country were to suffer a debt crisis in the near future, an-
other $50 billion would not be available.363
An LLR, however, "should have resources which, if not unlimited,
are well in excess of the largest needs that it is likely to face in a cri-
sis. '' 36 In the domestic context, because the Federal Reserve can
print money, it has unlimited access to capital.3m Judging from the
difficulty it has had in raising the additional capital to double the
356. See Sachs, supra note 2, at 14.
357. Lee C. Buchheit, Remarks, Comity, Act of State, and the International Debt
Crisis: Is There an Emerging Legal Equivalent of Bankruptcy Protection for Nations?,
79 Am. Soc'y Int'l L. Proc. 126, 135 (1985).
358. Mac~fillan, supra note 108, at 334-35; see Robert V. Hawn, Comment, The
Renegotiation of Official International Debt Whose Club Is It?, 17 U.C. Davis L Rev.
853, 855-56 (1984). The debtors assumed that good behavior was important in the
long-term for future access to capital markets. Thus the debtors did not repudiate
their debts. MacMillan, supra note 108, at 334. During the 1982 crisis, rather than
creating a debtors' cartel as creditors feared, A Middle Way, supra note 48, at 16,
borrowers behaved with the "utmost prudence and restraint." Sidney Dell, Crisis
Management and the International Debt Problem, 40 Int'l J. 655, 670 (1985).
359. See A Middle Way, supra note 48, at 33-34.
360. See Oechsli, supra note 237, at 330.
361. See MacNfillan, supra note 108, at 306.
362. Id.; see supra part I.B.
363. MacMillan, supra note 108, at 306.
364. Guttentag & Herring, supra note 321, at 10.
365. Garcia and Plautz, supra note 173, at 43.
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GAB,3 66 the EFM would be unable to undertake several large crises
at once.367 Because the EFM will not have adequate resources, it will
not be able to maintain properly the confidence of creditors and en-
sure they act collectively.
In contrast, the IBA, because it is a regulator, not a lender,368 can
review and grant multiple petitions from sovereign debtors for an au-
tomatic stay against creditor repayment demands. 369 The IBA's abil-
ity to manage multiple crises is necessary in today's era of short-term
portfolio finance when multiple countries may simultaneously face a
shortage of capital during a creditor exodus.37 ° The United States as-
sumed that easing the crisis in Mexico would in turn calm the financial
markets in other emerging markets.37' The "Neighborhood Effect,"
however, raises the possibility that financial markets would conclude
that other countries with similar economic circumstances as Mexico
needed similar arrangements and would withdraw their money from
those countries as well.3 72 The IBA, by issuing automatic stays and
convening multiple arbitration panels, can effectively manage the
"neighborhoods."
B. The IMF Should Organize the International Bankruptcy Agency
As a Separate and Independent Affiliate
The IMF should organize the IBA because the IMF specializes in
aiding countries in short-term liquidity crises and the IMF is already
the central coordinating institution of sovereign debt. Further, or-
ganizing the IBA affords the IMF an opportunity to reestablish itself
in its original role as lender to sovereign debtors who need short-term
liquidity funding. The IMF, however, is an inherently political organi-
zation. Thus, following the model of the World Bank Group, it should
establish the IBA as a separate and independent affiliate under the
IMF umbrella.
1. The IMF Specializes in Aiding Countries in Liquidity Crises
The Bretton Woods Agreement established the IMF precisely to
manage liquidity crises similar to the one Mexico suffered in 1995.37 3
366. See Halifax, supra note 24, at CRS-5. While some commentators have sug-
gested that some of the stronger East Asian nations or the smaller European nations
should contribute, these nations thus far have shown no willingness to contribute.
Camdessus Hopeful, supra note 300, at A194.
367. Prowse, supra note 133, at 12.
368. See supra note 339 and accompanying text.
369. See supra notes 255-59 and accompanying text.
370. See Cline, supra note 67, at 504.
371. See id.
372. See id.; see supra notes 155-58 and accompanying text.
373. Camdessus Address, supra note 24, at 3 (stating that the IMF was authorized
under the Article I of the Articles of Agreement to aid Mexico, a nation undergoing
balance of payments difficulties).
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Since its inception at Bretton Woods in 1944, the IMF has had two
responsibilities: the management of international liquidity and coop-
erative balance of payment adjustments.374 The IMF's founders envi-
sioned the organization as one that would provide temporary aid to
nations in balance of payment difficulties in order to avoid restrictive
trade practices and promote a code of good monetary behavior.375
In accord with the IMF's purposes, the Mexican crisis in 1995 repre-
sented a disruption in temporary cash flow, not a failure of long-term
solvency. 376 In the late 1980s, Mexico enacted long-term structural
The IMF was established in 1944 in Bretton Woods, New Hampshire. Asherman,
supra note 167, at 235. Article I of the Articles of Agreement enunciates the purposes
of the IMF:
I) To promote international monetary co-operation through a permanent
institution which provides the machinery for consultation and collabo-
ration on international monetary problems.
II) To facilitate the expansion and balanced growth of international trade,
and to contribute thereby to the promotion and maintenance of high
levels of employment and real income and to the development of the
productive resources of all members as primary objectives of economic
policy.
III) To promote exchange stability, to maintain orderly exchange arrange-
ments among members, and to avoid competitive exchange
depreciation.
IV) To assist in the establishment of a multilateral system of payments in
respect of current transactions between members and in the elimination
of foreign exchange restrictions which hamper the growth of world
trade.
V) To give confidence to members by making the Fund's resources avail-
able to them under adequate safeguards, thus providing them with op-
portunity to correct maladjustments in their balance of payments
without resorting to measures destructive of national or international
prosperity.
VI) In accordance with the above, to shorten the duration and lessen the
degree of disequilibrium in the international balances of payments of
members.
Articles of Agreement, supra note 289, art. I.
374. See MacBean & Snowden, supra note 88, at 37; Joseph Gold, The Relationship
Between the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, 15 Creighton L Rev.
499, 518 (1982).
The Bretton Woods participants, during the interwar period, had engaged in com-
petitive currency devaluations, multiple currency practices, exchange controls and im-
port licensing, all which hindered international trade and global prosperity. Edwards,
supra note 8, at 4. Nations realized that a lack of adequate foreign reserves to finance
balance of payments deficits was often the cause of destructive trade practices. See
MacBean & Snowden, supra note 88, at 37. The IMF was established to lend money
under these circumstances and to encourage global monetary cooperation.
Asherman, supra note 167, at 235-36.
375. See Dominique Carreau, Why Not Merge the International Monetary Fund
(IMF) With the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (World
Bank)?, 62 Fordham L. Rev 1989, 1989 (1994).
To this end, the IMF administers the General Resources Account, a pool of mone-
tary assets from which members can draw to meet their balance of payments needs.
Edwards, supra note 8, at 12; see supra note 123.
376. See supra note 101.
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economic reforms, diversifying its exports and privatizing its econ-
omy.377 In early 1995, Mexico simply needed a temporary injection of
liquidity until it had replenished its foreign reserves through oil
sales.378 When capital began fleeing before the oil revenues material-
ized and sizable foreign loans did not appear likely to be granted
quickly, Mexico was forced to resort to a destructive devaluation of its
currency.379 Under these circumstances, the IMF would typically ex-
tend a loan to Mexico to aid it with its current account deficit. 38
The Mexican crisis, however, confronted the IMF with a scenario it
had not previously encountered.3 81 Rather than syndicated bank
loans and potential mass ruin restraining individual action by large
commercial banks, the IMF in early 1995 encountered a multitude of
panicking private portfolio investors and bondholders. 38, Technologi-
cal innovations permitted these investors to dump their Mexican in-
vestments at the touch of a computer button,383 constricting the time
frame in which the IMF could act. Furthermore, the immense volume
of short-term portfolio investment fleeing Mexico required an amount
of money far above what the IMF is normally authorized to lend.384
As the administrator of the IBA, the IMF would be better equipped
to deal with these new developments in international investment. The
IMF would have the authority to react immediately to a crisis in inves-
tor confidence by imposing an automatic stay.385 The IMF, simultane-
ously, would be fulfilling its original role established at Bretton Woods
by aiding a temporarily illiquid nation encumbered by a large current
account deficit.386
2. The IMF Is the Primary Coordinator of Sovereign Debt
Readjustment
The IMF is already the primary coordinating institution of debt
management.3 87 Following the 1982 debt crisis, when developing
countries turned to the IMF for money to service their debts, the IMF
was unwilling to impose unilateral adjustment programs on the devel-
oping countries. 88 Instead, the IMF presided over a quid pro quo
system which conditioned the cooperation of commercial banks,
377. Manzella, supra note 37, at 19.
378. See supra note 104 and accompanying text.
379. See supra part I.A.
380. See Camdessus Address, supra note 24, at 3.
381. See Cline, supra note 67, at 500.
382. See id.
383. See Greenspan Testimony, supra note 24, at 6.
384. See supra notes 123-26 and accompanying text.
385. See supra notes 255-59 and accompanying text.
386. See supra notes 373-75 and accompanying text.
387. See Bahrarn Nowzad, The Role of the IMF in Rescheduling International Debt,
in Default and Rescheduling: Corporate and Sovereign Borrowers 131, 133 (David
Suratgar ed., 1984).
388. See Asherman, supra note 167, at 296.
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debtor nations, and the IMF upon the participation of all three par-
ties.389 The IMF required the banks to provide fresh loans to debtor
states and required debtor states to institute harsh adjustment pro-
grams as preconditions for an IMF loan.390 Later, a reciprocal re-
quirement materialized under which the IMF and the commercial
banks together shaped ways to refinance a debtor country's debts. 391
The IMF would provide aid to a debtor only if the country's IMF-
approved adjustment program included commercial lending.392 The
banks, in turn, would lend only to countries which had implemented
an IMF-approved adjustment program.393 This close cooperation be-
tween the IMF and the commercial banks enhanced creditor solidarity
and forged a strong relationship between the IMF and the commercial
banks.394 The IMF acted as a "unifying vehicle to internalize for [in-
vestment] banks as a whole the external benefits that the rescue pack-
age would confer on them. '395
As the administrator of a bankruptcy agency, the IMF would con-
tinue in this capacity as a "unifying vehicle." It would force bond-
holders to act collectively to allow the debtor to readjust its debt. The
IMF, in return, would protect creditors by overseeing a country's reor-
ganization plan in a manner similar to the IMF oversight of a debtor
nation's adherence to an IMF standby arrangement.39 6 Unlike the
IMF's past practice of pressuring debtors into accepting conditions
unilaterally prescribed by the IMF,397 the IBA would allow both debt-
389. See MacMillan, supra note 108, at 319.
390. See Asherman, supra note 167, at 297.
391. See MacMillan, supra note 108, at 320.
392. Id.; see Richard W. Edwards, Jr., Is an IMF Stand-By Arrangement a "Seal of
Approval" on Which Other Creditors Can Rely?, 17 N.Y.U. J. Int'l L & Pol. 573,573-
74 (1985).
393. MaclWflan, supra note 108, at 320.
394. Id. at 320-21.
395. Id. at 318 (quoting William R. Cline, International Debt: Systemic Risk and
Policy Response 75 (1984)).
396. See supra note 167 and accompanying text.
397. The IMF has been the object of accusations that it imposes its economic condi-
tions at the expense of a nation's welfare. Melissa H. Birch, The International Mone-
tary Fund, in Dealing with Debt: International Financial Negotiations and
Adjustment Bargaining 19, 25 (Thomas J. Biersteker ed., 1993); see John Williamson,
On Seeking to Improve IMF Conditionality, 73 Am. Econ. Rev. 354, 357 (1983). Crit-
ics suspect that the IMF unilaterally imposes austere conditions to ensure that large
commercial banks from the northern hemisphere are repaid at the cost of the political
stability of a debtor nation. Oechsli, supra note 237, at 322. In addition, the IMF faces
accusations that it unilaterally imposes the same economic prescriptions on all debtor
countries, regardless of their individual circumstances. See Sidney Dell, Stabilization:
The Political Economy of Overkill, in IMF Conditionality 17,22 (John Wlliamson ed.,
1983); see also A Modest Proposal, supra note 43, at 20 (stating that the IMF treats
"deep structural problems as short-term liquidity crises").
Historically, the net effect of IMF-imposed policies was to lower the standard of
living in the debtor countries by causing unemployment and increasing the price of
goods for the entire population. Brian Trubitt, Note, International Monetary Fund
1996] 2695
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ors and creditors to participate in fashioning the plan of adjustment. 398
Under the IMF's oversight, debtors can fashion a plan of adjustment
according to their own perceived best interests and creditors can com-
ment on and object to the plan.399
3. The IMF Can Reassert its Original Role in World Affairs
An increasing need is present among both developing and devel-
oped countries for an agency that can respond to spontaneous and
unexpected shifts in market psychology among portfolio investors,
and provide aid for subsequent short-term liquidity crises.4 °0 The
Mexican crisis demonstrated that neither the IMF nor any interna-
tional organization, as presently constituted, has the speed or re-
sources to cope in today's capital markets where a massive outflow of
short-term foreign capital can result from the touch of a computer
button.4o'
The IMF, acting as an international bankruptcy agency, would fill
this vacuum in international financial management while reasserting
its original role as lender to temporarily illiquid nations. 40 Although
the Bretton Woods organizers originally envisioned the IMF as a
global organization to aid all countries in short-term liquidity crises,
the IMF has strayed from that original purpose.0 3 The IMF has "lost
most of its relevance" for developed countries40 4 and has been rele-
Conditionality and Options for Aggrieved Fund Members, 20 Vand. J. Transnat'l L.
665, 681-85 (1987).
398. See supra part III.A.3.
399. See supra notes 224-26 and accompanying text.
400. See supra part I.C.
401. While the IMF was designed as an "international lender of last resort," Sachs,
supra note 2, at 3, "[t]he IMF as currently constituted is simply not large enough to
deal with [the Mexican crisis] itself" nor can it react quickly enough to respond effec-
tively to confidence crisis. U.S. and International Response to the Mexican Financial
Crisis: Hearings before the House Comm. on Banking and Financial Services, 104th
Cong., 1st Sess. 13, 20 (1995) (statement of Warren Christopher, Secretary of State).
402. See Minton-Beddoes, supra note 105, at 126-27.
403. Id.
404. Id. at 127. The demise of the original par value system, which had empowered
the IMF to oversee global exchange rates, was a serious blow to the IMF's normative
powers from which it has never fully recovered. Carreau, supra note 375, at 1995. The
par value system was a system of officialized and mandatory exchange rates super-
vised by the IMF. Id. at 1994. Under the Articles of Agreement, states agreed: (1) to
value their currencies according to the prevailing value of gold; (2) to maintain this
value; and (3) to refrain from modifying this par value without first seeking IMF ap-
proval. Id. This par value system collapsed when President Nixon announced the
United States' withdrawal from the par value system and allowed the dollar to float.
Id.
Developed, industrial countries are now coordinating their exchange rates outside
of the IMF. See Minton-Beddoes, supra note 105, at 127. Furthermore, because the
Eurocurrency markets provide a source of unconditional finance, developed countries
no longer turn to the IMF for funding. Id. For the developed countries, the IMF
"collates useful statistics, undertakes useful economic research, and occasionally rec-
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gated to controlling the finances of developing countries.' 5 The IMF
now primarily extends long-term loans to developing countries to en-
able them to "'grow' their way out of their extreme debt burden."4 6
The IMF's involvement in providing long-term aid, however, en-
croaches upon the activities originally reserved for the World Bank. °7
Consequently, the significant overlap in their functions has led to calls
for an IMF/World Bank merger.40 By renewing its focus on countries
with temporary liquidity problems in its capacity as an IBA, the IMF
can distinguish its role from that of the World Bank.4"
C. The IMF Should Establish the IBA As an Independent and
Separate Affiliate
The IMF, as presently constituted, cannot act as a neutral arbiter of
provisions similar to those found in Chapter 9 of the Bankruptcy
Code.41 0 The IMF, unlike most public international law organizations,
follows a weighted voting system under which voting power is based
on quota size. 1' In this system, political considerations are often the
ommends economic policies that influence domestic debates" yet has no actual influ-
ence. Id.
Eurocurrencies are those currencies that are transacted by banks outside of the
country where the currency is issued and Eurocurrency markets are where these cur-
rencies are traded. Ronald I. McKinnon, The Eurocurrency Market 2 (1977).
405. M4lnton-Beddoes, supra note 105, at 127; see Charles Lipson, International
Debt and International Institutions, in The Politics of International Debt 219, 232-34
(Miles Kahler ed., 1986).
406. Cynthia C. Lichtenstein, Aiding the Transformation of Economies: Is the
Fund's Conditionality Appropriate to the Task?, 62 Fordham L Rev. 1943, 1949
(1994).
407. See Carreau, supra note 375, at 1989-90. After the 1982 crisis, the IMF shifted
its focus from aiding countries with temporary liquidity problems to aiding those who
needed long-term structural reforms, a role originally envisioned for the World Bank.
See Bradlow, supra note 123, at 405-06 (stating that the IMF was designed originally
to deal with temporary balance of payments issues and not structural deficits); Ed-
ward S. Mason & Robert E. Asher, The World Bank Since Bretton Woods 34 (1973).
For a discussion of the World Bank, see infra note 416.
408. Carreau, supra note 375, at 1989.
409. Id. at 1989-90 (stating that the boundaries between the IMF and the World
Bank have grown indistinct).
410. See Hurlock, supra note 48, at 10-11.
411. See William N. Gianaris, Weighted Voting in the International Monetary Fund
and the World Bank, 14 Fordham Int'l L.. 910, 921 (1990-91). Despite protests by
other states who wanted equal representation under the doctrine of equality of states,
this weighted voting system was implemented at Bretton Woods. See id. at 921-22.
The doctrine of equality of states maintains that all states have equal legal rights and
duties, and thus they are all entitled to one vote in international organizations regard-
less of their economic, political, or social differences. Malcolm N. Shaw, International
Law 135-36 (2d ed. 1986).
Other organizations do not have weighted voting. For example, the United Nations
Conference on Trade and Development ("UNCTAD"), which was created in 1964 to
establish multilateral treaties to promote international trade, does not follow a
weighted voting system. Gianaris, supra, at 934. Each member of UNClAD has one
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most important factors in decision making.412 Notably, the IMF has
never made an important decision, "no matter how strongly supported
by other members of the IMF, which did not meet with American
approval." '413 Consequently, a significant amount of distrust of the
IMF exists in the developing world.414
In contrast to the practices of the IMF, an IBA administering proce-
dures similar to those found in Chapter 9 would have to exercise a
relatively dispassionate supervision of bankruptcy cases.415 The estab-
lishment of the Internati onal Center for the Settlement of Investment
Disputes and Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency, two of the
organizations within the World Bank Group,41 6 reflects an increasing
international concern for the depoliticization of investment disputes
and can serve as models for an IBA.417 The ICSID provides a forum
vote, and approval by a two-thirds majority of the members present and voting is
required for substantive decisions. Id.
The GATT is another organization that does not have weighted voting. Id. at 935;
see supra note 88 (describing the GATT). In the GATF, a simple majority makes all
decisions except for the decisions to amend its basic rules or Articles. Gianaris, supra,
at 935. These decisions require unanimity or a two-thirds majority. Id.
412. Kendall W. Stiles, Negotiating Debt: The IMF Lending Process 6 (1991); see
Minton-Beddoes, supra note 105, at 128. Wealthy countries, the primary contributors
to the IMF General Resources Account and thus the ones with the most power, are
also almost inevitably the major creditors in any sovereign debt crisis. Hurlock, supra
note 48, at 11. The IMF has been criticized for aiming to increase the "liberalization
of the international economic system and to directly sustain the economic viability of
nations considered 'strategic allies' of the major creditors, rather than acting as [a
neutral] international economic physician." Stiles, supra, at 6.
413. Asherman, supra note 167, at 257. Although weighted voting procedures exist,
rarely is a vote held in the IMF. Gianaris, supra note 411, at 924. Generally, decisions
are made by consensus. Id. Voting strength, nonetheless, is crucial in many aspects of
IMF decision-making, such as the biennial election of executive directors as well as
circumstances when decisions require the approval of special majorities. Id. at 924-
25.
414. The Mexican crisis fueled this distrust. The IMF's contribution of $17.8 billion
to the bailout reflects less the importance of Mexico to the global economy than upon
its strategic importance to the United States. See Minton-Beddoes, supra note 105, at
128.
415. Winston E. Langley, Third World Debt Is Everybody's Problem, N.Y. Tunes,
Sept. 22, 1987, at A34.
416. The World Bank was organized at Bretton Woods in 1944 as the sister organi-
zation of the IMF. Edwards, supra note 8, at 44. The World Bank's four affiliates-
the International Finance Corporation ("IFC"), the International Development Asso-
ciation ("IDA"), the ICSID, and MIGA-form the World Bank Group. See Mason
& Asher, supra note 407, at 79-82; Settlement of Disputes, supra note 240, at 98. Un-
like the IMF, which was created to provide short-term balance of payments loans, the
World Bank lends money for productive investment to underdeveloped countries.
Gold, supra note 374, at 505. To join the World Bank, prospective members must firstjoin the IMF. Edwards, supra note 8, at 45. The World Bank, too, follows a system of
weighted voting. Id.
417. To depoliticize investment disputes and balance the interests of all parties, the
ICSID gives foreign investors direct access to a neutral forum in which to arbitrate
disputes in return for the investors' agreement to surrender the protection of the in-
vestors' home state. Kenneth S. Jacob, Note, Reinvigorating ICSID with a New Mis-
sion and With Renewed Respect for Party Autonomy, 33 Va. J. Int'l L. 123, 127 (1992).
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for foreign investors and sovereigns to arbitrate their investment dis-
putes.418 MIGA's aim is to stimulate investment in developing coun-
tries by insuring investments against non-commercial risks.41 Both
organizations aim to create fair and impartial decision-making bodies
by ensuring adequate representation of both developed and develop-
ing countries in investment disputes and to promote investment in de-
veloping countries.42
The IMF, following the establishment of the World Bank's ICSID
and MIGA, should create the IBA as a "depoliticized" affiliate to su-
pervise the international Chapter 9 process.421 Through affiliation
with the IMF, the IBA would function not only as a mechanism for
MIGA seeks to minimize the political aspects of investment disputes by removing
the home and host country from the dispute. Gregg B. Brelsford, International Invest-
ment Insurance-The Convention Establishing the Multilateral Investment Guarantee
Agency, 27 Harv. Int'l L.. 735, 743 (1986). All investor claims are submitted to
MIGA. Upon payment of the claim by MIGA, the investor will assign all rights re-
lated to the insured investment to MIGA and MIGA will pursue these rights against
the host country. I& MIGA also has the authority to facilitate dispute settlement
when disputes arise between investors and host countries. See Ibrahim F. I. Shihata.
The Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency, 20 Int'l Law. 485, 496 (1986).
418. Rowat, supra note 241, at 107. The ICSID settles disputes by empowering
Conciliation Commissions and Arbitral Tribunals to issue binding decisions. See id. at
111. Arbitral Tribunals usually consist of three panel members. Id. Each party to the
dispute appoints one member and a third is appointed by the agreement of both par-
ties. Id.
419. See id. at 127.
420. Id. at 134. Neither organization has a traditional weighted voting structure
like the lIMF. In the ICSID, each participating state has one representative in the
ICSID's governing body, the Administrative Council and each representative is enti-
tled to cast one vote. See Greater Depoliticization, supra note 241, at 4.
MIGA, while it retains a system of weighted voting, combines this weighted voting
system with the equal representation of developed investor countries and developing
host countries. Brelsford, supra note 417, at 741. This system provides voting parity
among developed and developing countries. Id.
421. The World Bank has adapted institutionally to changes in world affairs by es-
tablishing independent and separate affiliates. See Stephen A. Silard, International
Economic Institutions: The Challenge of Coordination, 4 Am. U. J. Int'l L & Pol'y 67,
73-74 (1989) [hereinafter International Economic Institutions]; see supra note 416 for
a discussion of the World Bank group.
The IMF, by contrast, has adapted to global economic changes through the estab-
lishment of "financial facilities" within the IMF itself International Economic Institu-
tions, supra, at 70-71. The primary facilities in the IMF are the Extended Facility, the
Supplementary Facility, the Compensatory Financing Facility, the Buffer Stock Fi-
nancing Facility, and the Oil Facility. Tony Killick, An Introduction to the International
Monetary Fund, in The Quest for Economic Stabilisation: The IMF and the Third
World 128, 134-35 Crony Killick ed., 1984) (outlining in detail the purpose of each
facility). The World Bank's differing practice of establishing affiliates rather than fa-
cilities reflects the manner in which the World Bank finances its loans. The World
Bank, unlike the IMF which is funded through subscription from member states, bor-
rows on the international capital markets with backing from official lenders. Interna-
tional Economic Institutions, supra, at 73-74. Thus, the separation of affiliates from
the World Bank is indicative of the World Bank's desire to keep its official funding
separate from its market-based activities and to protect the World Bank from finan-
cial risk arising from its new functions. Id. at 74.
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dispute resolution but also as an "instrument of international policy
for the promotion of economic development. '42 2 Like the ICSID and
MIGA, this agency's central mission would be the depoliticization of
financial crises to ensure that the parties reach the best economic deci-
sions. The IMF should establish its own separate agency rather than
relying on another forum like the ICSID because "the external debt
renegotiation process requires continuous oversight and investigation
by experts in international finance and economics. ' 423 Keeping the
agency within the IMF would sensibly link the information gathering
mechanism with the enforcement mechanism.424
The IBA, not the EFM, is the more effective management solution
to handle future sovereign debt crises. The IBA can act quickly, it
does not generate a moral hazard, and it is relatively inexpensive to
administrate. The IBA should be organized under the IMF umbrella
as a separate and independent affiliate.
CONCLUSION
The Mexican peso crisis, and the confusion and dissension sur-
rounding the subsequent United States-sponsored bailout, demon-
strated that the current procedures for managing sovereign debt crises
are outdated and impractical. Globalization, technological innova-
tion, and the growth of short-term capital have created an extremely
volatile international financial marketplace where a creditor panic in
one nation's economy can detrimentally affect distant economies
within minutes. The international community needs an organization
that can respond quickly and decisively to creditor panics in multiple
nations while minimizing the resulting moral hazard.
The International Bankruptcy Agency is the proper organization to
meet this need. The IBA, employing debtor-oriented provisions simi-
lar to those found in U.S. Bankruptcy Code Chapter 9, can protect
multiple sovereign debtors from an onslaught of high-strung creditors
racing to dump their investments. The IBA will not generate a moral
hazard, however, because it will force debtors and creditors to negoti-
ate a readjustment plan where concessions will be extracted from both
sides. The IBA should be established by the IMF as a separate and
independent affiliate under the IMF umbrella. Once established, the
IBA would prevent a repetition of the chaos and anxiety that sur-
rounded the Mexican crisis.
422. See George Delaume, ICSID Arbitration, reprinted in International Law 341,
342 (Barry E. Carter & Phillip R. Trimble eds., 1991) (describing the parallel purpose
of the ICSID).
423. Ruben Sklar, Comment, Renegotiation of External Debt: The Allied Bank
Case and the Chapter 11 Analogy, 17 U. Miami Inter-Am. L. Rev. 59, 83 (1985).
424. Id.
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